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A Pricing Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing in Edge Computing

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Mobile Computing, Applications, and Services (MobiCASE 2019)

Abstract

Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) has been recognized as a promising method to acquire massive volume of data. Stimulating the enthusiasm of participants could be challenging at the same time. In this paper, we first propose a three-layer mobile crowd sensing architecture and introduce edge servers into it. The edge servers are used to process raw data and improve response time. Our goal is to maximize social welfare. Specifically, we model the social welfare maximization problem by Markov decision process and study a convex optimization pricing problem in the proposed three-layer architecture. The size of the tasks the edge servers assign is adjustable in this system. Then Lagrange multiplier method is leveraged to solve the problem. We derive the experimental data from real-world dataset and extensive simulations demonstrate the performance of our proposed method.

Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61872044, 61502040), Beijing Municipal Program for Excellent Teacher Promotion (no. PXM2017_014224.000028), Beijing Municipal Program for Top Talent Cultivation (CIT&TCD201804055), Open Program of Beijing Key Laboratory of Internet Culture and Digital Dissemination Research (ICDDXN001), Qinxin Talent Program of Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Supplementary and Supportive Project for Teachers at Beijing Information Science and Technology University (No. 5111823401) and Key Research and Cultivation Projects at Beijing Information Science and Technology University (No. 5211823411).

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Correspondence to Lianyong Qi .

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© 2019 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Chen, X., Li, Z., Qi, L., Chen, Y., Zhao, Y., Chen, S. (2019). A Pricing Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing in Edge Computing. In: Yin, Y., Li, Y., Gao, H., Zhang, J. (eds) Mobile Computing, Applications, and Services. MobiCASE 2019. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 290. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28468-8_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28468-8_14

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-28468-8

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