Abstract
Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) has been recognized as a promising method to acquire massive volume of data. Stimulating the enthusiasm of participants could be challenging at the same time. In this paper, we first propose a three-layer mobile crowd sensing architecture and introduce edge servers into it. The edge servers are used to process raw data and improve response time. Our goal is to maximize social welfare. Specifically, we model the social welfare maximization problem by Markov decision process and study a convex optimization pricing problem in the proposed three-layer architecture. The size of the tasks the edge servers assign is adjustable in this system. Then Lagrange multiplier method is leveraged to solve the problem. We derive the experimental data from real-world dataset and extensive simulations demonstrate the performance of our proposed method.
Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61872044, 61502040), Beijing Municipal Program for Excellent Teacher Promotion (no. PXM2017_014224.000028), Beijing Municipal Program for Top Talent Cultivation (CIT&TCD201804055), Open Program of Beijing Key Laboratory of Internet Culture and Digital Dissemination Research (ICDDXN001), Qinxin Talent Program of Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Supplementary and Supportive Project for Teachers at Beijing Information Science and Technology University (No. 5111823401) and Key Research and Cultivation Projects at Beijing Information Science and Technology University (No. 5211823411).
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Ni, J., Zhang, K., Yu, Y., et al.: Providing task allocation and secure deduplication for mobile crowdsensing via fog computing. IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. (2018)
Jing, Y., Guo, B., Wang, Z., et al.: CrowdTracker: optimized urban moving object tracking using mobile crowd sensing. IEEE Internet Things J. 5(5), 3452–3463 (2018)
Zhou, R., Li, Z., Wu, C.: A truthful online mechanism for location-aware tasks in mobile crowd sensing. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 17(8), 1737–1749 (2018)
Jezdovi\(\acute{c}\), I., Nedeljkovi\(\acute{c}\), N., \(\check{Z}\)ivojinovi\(\acute{c}\), L., et al.: Smart city: a system for measuring noise pollution. Smart Cities Reg. Dev. (SCRD) J. 2(1), 79–85 (2018)
Tse, R., Zhang, L.F., Lei, P., et al.: Social network based crowd sensing for intelligent transportation and climate applications. Mob. Netw. Appl. 23(1), 1–7 (2017)
Kalejaiye, G.B., Orefice, H.R., Bafutto, M., et al.: Frugal crowd sensing for bus arrival time prediction in developing regions: poster abstract. In: International Conference on Internet-Of-Things Design and Implementation, pp. 355–356. ACM (2017). https://doi.org/10.1145/3054977.3057328
Matarazzo, T.J., Santi, P., Pakzad, S.N., et al.: Crowdsensing framework for monitoring bridge vibrations using moving smartphones. Proc. IEEE 106(4), 577–593 (2018)
Xu, Y., Zhu, Y., Qin, Z.: Urban noise mapping with a crowd sensing system. Wirel. Netw. 2018(3), 1–14 (2018)
Wang, J., Wang, F., Wang, Y., et al.: Social-network-assisted worker recruitment in mobile crowd sensing. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 18(7), 1661–1673 (2018)
Zhang, Y., Jiang, C., Song, L., et al.: Incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsourcing using an optimized tournament model. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 35(4), 880–892 (2017)
Ni, J., Zhang, K., Xi, Q., et al.: Enabling strong privacy preservation and accurate task allocation for mobile crowdsensing. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. (2019). https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2019.2908638
Li, W., Liao, K., He, Q., Xia, Y.: Performance-aware cost-effective resource provisioning for future grid IoT-cloud system. J. Energy Eng. (2019, to appear). https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)EY.1943-7897.0000611
Jin, H., Su, L., Chen, D., et al.: Thanos: incentive mechanism with quality awareness for mobile crowd sensing. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. (2018)
Sun, J.: An incentive scheme based on heterogeneous belief values for crowd sensing in mobile social networks. In: 2013 Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), pp. 1717–1722 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2013.6831321
Peng, D., Wu, F., Chen, G.: Data quality guided incentive mechanism design for crowdsensing. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 17(2), 307–319 (2018)
Gao, G., Xiao, M., Wu, J., et al.: Truthful incentive mechanism for nondeterministic crowdsensing with vehicles. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 17(12), 2982–2997 (2018)
Duan, X., Zhao, C., He, S., et al.: Distributed algorithms to compute walrasian equilibrium in mobile crowdsensing. IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron. 64(5), 4048–4057 (2017)
Li, J., Cai, Z., Wang, J., et al.: Truthful incentive mechanisms for geographical position conflicting mobile crowdsensing systems. IEEE Trans. Comput. Soc. Syst. 5(2), 324–334 (2018)
Zheng, Z., Peng, Y., Wu, F., et al.: An online pricing mechanism for mobile crowdsensing data markets. In: Proceedings of the 18th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, pp. 1–10. ACM (2017). https://doi.org/10.1145/3084041.3084044
He, S., Shin, D.H., Zhang, J., et al.: An exchange market approach to mobile crowdsensing: pricing, task allocation, and walrasian equilibrium. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 35(4), 921–934 (2017)
Han, K., Huang, H., Luo, J.: Quality-aware pricing for mobile crowdsensing. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 26(4), 1728–1741 (2018)
Chen, X., Jiao, L., Li, W., et al.: Efficient multi-user computation offloading for mobile-edge cloud computing. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 2016(5), 2795–2808 (2016)
Liu, Y., Xu, C., Zhan, Y., et al.: Incentive mechanism for computation offloading using edge computing: a Stackelberg game approach. Comput. Netw. 129(201), 399–409 (2017)
Yu, H., Cheung, M.H., Gao, L., et al.: Economics of public Wi-Fi monetization and advertising. In: IEEE INFOCOM 2016-The 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, pp. 1–9 (2016)
Zhou, Z., Liao, H., Gu, B., et al.: Robust mobile crowd sensing: when deep learning meets edge computing. IEEE Netw. 32(4), 54–60 (2018)
Hu, T., Yang, T., Hu, B.: A data quality index based incentive mechanism for smartphone crowdsensing. In: 2016 IEEE/CIC International Conference on Communications in China (ICCC), pp. 1–6. IEEE (2016). https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCChina.2016.7636875
Yang, D., Xue, G., Fang, X., et al.: Crowdsourcing to smartphones: incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. In: Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, 2012, pp. 173–184. ACM (2012). https://doi.org/10.1145/2348543.2348567
Singla, A., Krause, A.: Incentives for privacy tradeoff in community sensing. In: First AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (2013)
Esser, E., Zhang, X., Chan, T.F.: A general framework for a class of first order primal-dual algorithms for convex optimization in imaging science. SIAM J. Imaging Sci. 3(4), 1015–1046 (2010)
Ota, K., Dong, M., Gui, J., et al.: QUOIN: incentive mechanisms for crowd sensing networks. IEEE Netw. 32(2), 114–119 (2018)
Wang, Z., Tan, R., Hu, J., et al.: Heterogeneous incentive mechanism for time-sensitive and location-dependent crowdsensing networks with random arrivals. Comput. Netw. 131(2018), 96–109 (2018)
Jiang, C., Gao, L., Duan, L., et al.: Data-centric mobile crowdsensing. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 17(6), 1275–1288 (2018)
Snap Datasets: Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection, June 2014. http://snap.stanford.edu/data
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
About this paper
Cite this paper
Chen, X., Li, Z., Qi, L., Chen, Y., Zhao, Y., Chen, S. (2019). A Pricing Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing in Edge Computing. In: Yin, Y., Li, Y., Gao, H., Zhang, J. (eds) Mobile Computing, Applications, and Services. MobiCASE 2019. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 290. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28468-8_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28468-8_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-28467-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-28468-8
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)