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European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

ESORICS 2019: Computer Security – ESORICS 2019 pp 790–808Cite as

Towards a Marketplace for Secure Outsourced Computations

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11735))

Abstract

This paper presents Kosto – a framework that provisions a marketplace for secure outsourced computations, wherein the pool of computing resources aggregates that which are offered by a large cohort of independent compute nodes. Kosto protects the confidentiality of clients’ inputs and the integrity of the outsourced computations using trusted hardware’s enclave execution (e.g., Intel SGX). Furthermore, Kosto mediates exchanges between the clients’ payments and the compute nodes’ work in servicing the clients’ requests without relying on a trusted third party. Empirical evaluation on the prototype implementation of Kosto shows that performance overhead incurred by enclave execution is as small as \(3\%\) for computation-intensive operations, and \(1.5{\times }\) for I/O-intensive operations.

H. Dang and D. Le Tien—Lead authors are alphabetically ordered.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    While we discuss unidirectional channels, Kosto supports bidirectional channels.

  2. 2.

    While \(\mathcal {B}\) could charge a service fee for the routing, for simplicity, we assume \(\mathcal {B}\) offers such routing free of charge. Extending Kosto to support such service fee is trivial.

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Acknowledgement

This research has been supported by the National Research Foundation, Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore under its Strategic Capability Research Centres Funding Initiative. We thank the anonymous reviewers their helpful feedback and insightful suggestions. Opinions and findings expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any of the sponsors.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

    Hung Dang & Ee-Chien Chang

  2. University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Dat Le Tien

Authors
  1. Hung Dang
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  2. Dat Le Tien
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  3. Ee-Chien Chang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hung Dang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. NEC Corporation, Kawasaki, Japan

    Kazue Sako

  2. University of Surrey, Guildford, UK

    Steve Schneider

  3. University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg

    Peter Y. A. Ryan

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Dang, H., Le Tien, D., Chang, EC. (2019). Towards a Marketplace for Secure Outsourced Computations. In: Sako, K., Schneider, S., Ryan, P. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2019. ESORICS 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11735. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_38

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_38

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-29959-0

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