Abstract
In recent work, Aziz et al. [4] consider refugee allocation as a matching problem, akin to the well-known hospitals-residents problem. They consider a wide range of stability conditions. Hedonic games are a well-studied class of coalition formation games, that encompass the classical matching problems. We propose a transformation of the Refugee Allocation Problem as formulated by Aziz et al. [4] into the setting of hedonic games, parametrized by a set extension rule. We show that different set extension rules lead to different stability concepts, derived from the central concept of core stability in hedonic games, mirroring some of the stability concepts proposed by Aziz et al. [4].
This work was supported in part by DFG grant RO 1202/14-2.
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Notes
- 1.
In the literature it is common to assume that the preferences are at least weak orders; however, we will have to consider also orders that are not complete.
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Kuckuck, B., Rothe, J., Weißenfeld, A. (2019). Refugee Allocation in the Setting of Hedonic Games. In: Pekeč, S., Venable, K.B. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11834. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31489-7_5
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