Abstract
Through utilizing sensing and computing capabilities of mobile devices, mobile crowdsourcing network (MCN) can collect and analyze data in a cost-effective way. However, due to the selfishness of mobile devices, they may be reluctant to participate in crowdsourcing without additional incentives. In this paper, the incentive mechanism to encourage mobile devices’ participation in the multi-tasks of crowdsourcing is designed. By modelling MCN as a labour market, the crowdsourcing incentive mechanism is regarded as a moral hazard model under contract-based asymmetric information scenarios. Moreover, considering the interaction among crowdsourcing tasks, a multi-dimensional contract model is proposed. By evaluating mobile users’ performance, the service provider will reward and stimulate them to participate in crowdsourcing and work harder. Results demonstrate that the proposed contract has excellent performance in crowdsourcing incentives.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Jarrett, J., Saleh, I., Blake, M., Thorpe, S., Grandison T., Malcolm, R.: Mobile services for enhancing human crowdsourcing with computing elements. In: IEEE International Conference on Mobile Services, pp. 149–152 (2014)
Duan, L., Kubo, T., Sugiyama, K., Huang, J., Hasegawa, T., Walrand, J.: Incentive mechanisms for smartphone collaboration in data acquisition and distributed computing. In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, pp. 1701–1709 (2012)
Zhao, N., Chen, Y., Liu, R., Wu, M., Xiong, W.: Monitoring strategy for relay incentive mechanism in cooperative communications networks. Comput. Electr. Eng. 60, 14–29 (2017)
Zhao, N., Wu, M., Xiong, W., Liu, C.: Cooperative communication in cognitive radio networks under asymmetric information: a contract-theory based approach. Int. J. Distrib. Sens. Netw. 11, 1–11 (2015)
Qiu, T., Chen, B., Sangaiah, K.: A survey of mobile social networks: applications, social characteristics, and challenges. IEEE Syst. J. 12, 1–16 (2017)
Lu, J., Xin, Y., Zhang, Z., Liu, X., Li, K.: Game-theoretic design of optimal two-sided rating protocols for service exchange dilemma in crowdsourcing. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 13, 2801–2815 (2018)
Gogo, A., Cybenko, G., Garmire, E.: A crowd sourced pharmacovigilance approach using SMS-based asymmetric encryption. In: International Multi-conference on Computing in the Global Information Technology, pp. 226–231 (2010)
Zhao, N., Fan, M., Tian, C., Fan, P.: Contract-based incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsourcing networks. Algorithms 10, 1–13 (2017)
Wang, X., Umehira, M., Han, B., Li, P., Gu, Y., Wu, C.: Online incentive mechanism for crowdsourced radio environment map construction. In: IEEE International Conference on Communications, pp. 1–6 (2019)
Gao, L., Iosifidis, G., Huang, J., Tassiulas, L.: Hybrid data pricing for network-assisted user-provided connectivity. In: IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, pp. 682–690 (2014)
Ota, K., Dong, M., Gui, J., Liu, A.: QUOIN: incentive mechanisms for crowd sensing networks. IEEE Netw. 32, 1–6 (2018)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Zhao, N., Fan, M., Tian, C., Fan, P., He, X. (2020). Multi-dimensional Contract Incentive Design for Mobile Crowdsourcing Networks. In: Barolli, L., Hellinckx, P., Enokido, T. (eds) Advances on Broad-Band Wireless Computing, Communication and Applications. BWCCA 2019. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, vol 97. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33506-9_51
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33506-9_51
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-33505-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-33506-9
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)