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SAT-Based Automated Mechanism Design for False-Name-Proof Facility Location

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PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 11873))

Abstract

In the literature of mechanism design, market mechanisms have been developed by professionals based on their experience. The concept of automated mechanism design (AMD), initiated by Sandholm (2002), is a ground-breaking computer-aided framework to develop market mechanisms. In this paper, we apply a very recent AMD approach based on Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) to the mechanism design of false-name-proof facility location. We first provide a general theoretical characteristic of false-name-proof mechanisms, which enables a quite compact representation of target mechanisms. Our approach successfully reproduces several known results in the literature on false-name-proof facility locations over discrete structures. Furthermore, some unknown mechanisms are discovered for locating a public good on a 2-by-2 grid, and an impossibility result is revealed for locating a public bad, with an additional mild assumption, on a 2-by-3 grid. Finally, we demonstrate the extendability of our approach, by providing a new false-name-proof mechanism for a slightly modified problem of locating a public good.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The domain of single-peaked preferences coincides with that of single-dipped ones on a 2-by-2 grid. Thus, the same mechanism also works for locating a public bad.

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Acknowledgments

This work is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grants JP17H00761 and JP17H04695, and JST SICORP JPMJSC1607. The authors thank Ilan Nehama and Yuho Wada for their helpful comments and discussions. All errors are our own.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kyushu University, Fukuoka, 819-0395, Japan

    Nodoka Okada, Taiki Todo & Makoto Yokoo

  2. RIKEN AIP, Tokyo, Japan

    Taiki Todo & Makoto Yokoo

Authors
  1. Nodoka Okada
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  2. Taiki Todo
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  3. Makoto Yokoo
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nodoka Okada .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Università degli Studi di Torino, Turin, Italy

    Matteo Baldoni

  2. Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Mehdi Dastani

  3. Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

    Beishui Liao

  4. National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Tokyo, Japan

    Yuko Sakurai

  5. University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA

    Rym Zalila Wenkstern

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Okada, N., Todo, T., Yokoo, M. (2019). SAT-Based Automated Mechanism Design for False-Name-Proof Facility Location. In: Baldoni, M., Dastani, M., Liao, B., Sakurai, Y., Zalila Wenkstern, R. (eds) PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11873. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_20

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-33792-6

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