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New Opportunities for Compilers in Computer Security

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Languages and Compilers for Parallel Computing (LCPC 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 11882))

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Abstract

Compiler techniques have been deployed to prevent various security attacks. Examples include mitigating memory access corruption, control flow integrity checks, race detection, software diversity, etc.

Hardware fault and side-channel attacks, however, are typically thought to require hardware protection. Attempts have been made to mitigate some timing and fault attacks via compiler techniques, but these typically adversely affected performance and often created opportunities for other types of attacks. More can and should be done in this area by the compiler community.

This paper presents such a compiler approach that simultaneously mitigates two types of attacks, namely a fault and a side-channel attacks. Continued development in this area using compiler techniques can further improve security.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of California, Irvine, USA

    Junjie Shen, Zhi Chen, Alexandru Nicolau & Alexander V. Veidenbaum

  2. Accenture Cyber Security Technology Labs, Arlington, VA, USA

    Nahid Farhady Ghalaty

  3. Qualcomm Technologies, Inc., San Diego, USA

    Rosario Cammarota

Authors
  1. Junjie Shen
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  2. Zhi Chen
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  3. Nahid Farhady Ghalaty
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  4. Rosario Cammarota
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  5. Alexandru Nicolau
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  6. Alexander V. Veidenbaum
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alexander V. Veidenbaum .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

    Mary Hall

  2. University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

    Hari Sundar

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Shen, J., Chen, Z., Ghalaty, N.F., Cammarota, R., Nicolau, A., Veidenbaum, A.V. (2019). New Opportunities for Compilers in Computer Security. In: Hall, M., Sundar, H. (eds) Languages and Compilers for Parallel Computing. LCPC 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11882. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34627-0_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34627-0_4

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-34627-0

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