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An Efficient Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol

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Network and System Security (NSS 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11928))

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Abstract

Leakage-resilient (LR) cryptography including LR authenticated key exchange has been extensively studied in recent years. However, there is few literature to model and construct LR authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocol, which is the most practical cryptographic primitive for the group communication applications. In this paper, we first introduce an \(\lambda \)-bounded after-the-fact LR (\(\lambda \)-BAFLR) CK security model to assess the security of AGKE protocols in the leakage environments. Then by appropriately combining Diffie-Hellman (DH) group key exchange protocol and public key encryption with the security against adaptively chosen plaintext after-the-fact leakage attacks, we propose the first LR AGKE protocol, and show a formal proof of the \(\lambda \)-BAFLR CK security in the standard model based on the game simulation techniques. Our result shows that the proposed AGKE protocol attains the property of LR without incurring additional communication and computation cost by comparing with the related non-LR schemes.

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Acknowledgment

This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grants 61672010, 61702168 and 61701173, the Hubei Natural Science Foundation (2017CFB596), the HBUT Green Industry Technology Leading Project (ZZTS2017006), and the fund of Hubei Key Laboratory of Transportation Internet of Things (WHUTIOT-2017B001).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science, Hubei University of Technology, Wuhan, 430068, China

    Ou Ruan, Yang Yang & Mingwu Zhang

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  1. Ou Ruan
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  2. Yang Yang
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  3. Mingwu Zhang
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Correspondence to Mingwu Zhang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia

    Joseph K. Liu

  2. Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, China

    Xinyi Huang

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Ruan, O., Yang, Y., Zhang, M. (2019). An Efficient Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol. In: Liu, J., Huang, X. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11928. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36938-5_41

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36938-5_41

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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