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Phish-Hook: Detecting Phishing Certificates Using Certificate Transparency Logs

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Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2019)

Abstract

Certificate misissuance is a growing issue in the context of phishing attacks, as it leads inexperienced users to further trust fraudulent websites, if they are equipped with a technically valid certificate. Certificate Transparency (CT) aims at increasing the visibility of such malicious actions by requiring certificate authorities (CAs) to log every certificate they issue in public, tamper-proof, append-only logs. This work introduces Phish-Hook, a novel approach towards detecting phishing websites based on machine learning. Phish-Hook analyses certificates submitted to the CT system based on a conceptually simple, well-understood classification mechanism to effectively attest the phishing likelihood of newly issued certificates. Phish-Hook relies solely on CT log data and foregoes intricate analyses of websites’ source code and traffic. As a consequence, we are able to provide classification results in near real-time and in a resource-efficient way. Our approach advances the state of the art by classifying websites according to five different incremental certificate risk labels, instead of assigning a binary label. Evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, achieving a success rate of over 90%, while requiring fewer, less complex input data, and delivering results in near real-time.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://developers.facebook.com/tools/ct/subscriptions/.

  2. 2.

    https://sslmate.com/certspotter/.

  3. 3.

    https://medium.com/cali-dog-security/introducing-certstream-3fc13bb98067.

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Correspondence to Edona Fasllija .

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© 2019 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Fasllija, E., Enişer, H.F., Prünster, B. (2019). Phish-Hook: Detecting Phishing Certificates Using Certificate Transparency Logs. In: Chen, S., Choo, KK., Fu, X., Lou, W., Mohaisen, A. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2019. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 305. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37231-6_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37231-6_18

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-37231-6

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