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Power Analysis and Protection on SPECK and Its Application in IoT

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Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2019)

Abstract

Emerging applications such as the Internet of Things (IoT) promotes the development of lightweight cryptography. SPECK is a lightweight block cipher, specially designed for limited resource devices that was presented by National Security Agency. Nevertheless, before using SPECK in any practical application, protection against side-channel attacks must be paid attention to. In this paper, we take two attack positions into account and make effort to implement correlation power analysis on a naive software implementation of SPECK algorithm in the IoT application scenario. Our experimental results show that the real key fixed in the register can be successfully recovered when attack the XOR operations, while there is always an interference item that confuses the correct key when attack the modulo addition operation. Furthermore, we proposal a countermeasure against power attacks in the IoT application, and the protected SPECK only cost 53.01%, 6.27% and 318.18% of extra code, RAM and time, respectively.

Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61872040, U1836101), National Cryptography Development Fund (No. MMJJ20170201), Foundation of Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory (No. KJ-17-009).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, 100081, China

    Jing Ge, An Wang, Liehuang Zhu, Xin Liu & Ning Shang

  2. State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P.O. Box 5159, Beijing, 100878, China

    Jing Ge

  3. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100093, China

    An Wang

  4. Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory, Beijing, 100072, China

    Guoshuang Zhang

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  1. Jing Ge
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  2. An Wang
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  3. Liehuang Zhu
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  4. Xin Liu
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  5. Ning Shang
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  6. Guoshuang Zhang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to An Wang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Songqing Chen

  2. The University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, USA

    Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo

  3. Boston University, Lowell, MA, USA

    Xinwen Fu

  4. Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    Wenjing Lou

  5. University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA

    Aziz Mohaisen

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© 2019 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Ge, J., Wang, A., Zhu, L., Liu, X., Shang, N., Zhang, G. (2019). Power Analysis and Protection on SPECK and Its Application in IoT. In: Chen, S., Choo, KK., Fu, X., Lou, W., Mohaisen, A. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2019. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 305. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37231-6_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37231-6_20

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-37230-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-37231-6

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