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LizarMong: Excellent Key Encapsulation Mechanism Based on RLWE and RLWR

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Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2019 (ICISC 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11975))

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Abstract

The RLWE family algorithms submitted to the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process have each merit in terms of security, correctness, performance, and bandwidth. However, there is no splendid algorithm in all respects. Besides, various recent studies have been published that affect security and correctness, such as side-channel attacks and error dependencies. To date, though, no algorithm has fully considered all the aspects. We propose a novel Key Encapsulation Mechanism scheme called LizarMong, which is based on RLizard. LizarMong combines the merit of each algorithm and state-of-the-art studies. As a result, it achieves up to 85% smaller bandwidth and 3.3 times faster performance compared to RLizard. Compared to the NIST’s candidate algorithms with a similar security, the bandwidth is about 5–42% smaller, and the performance is about 1.2-4.1 times faster. Also, our scheme resists the known side-channel attacks.

J. Lee, Y. Ju and Y.-B. Kwon—These authors contributed equally to this work.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ring-LWE (RLWE), Ring-Learning With Rounding (RLWR), Module-LWE (MLWE), Module-LWR (MLWR), Integer-MLWE (I-MLWE).

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank anonymous reviews of ICISC 2019 and Jung Hee Cheon for their helpful comments and suggestions. This work was supported as part of the Military Crypto Research Center (UD170109ED) funded by Defense the Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) and the Agency for Defense Development (ADD).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Engineering Practice, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea

    Chi-Gon Jung & Seong-Woo Kim

  2. Department of Financial Information Security, Kookmin University, Seoul, Korea

    JongHyeok Lee

  3. Department of Mathematics, Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea

    Youngjin Ju

  4. Department of IT Convergence, Hansung University, Seoul, Korea

    Yong-Been Kwon

  5. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea

    Yunheung Paek

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  1. Chi-Gon Jung
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Correspondence to Chi-Gon Jung .

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  1. Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

    Jae Hong Seo

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Jung, CG., Lee, J., Ju, Y., Kwon, YB., Kim, SW., Paek, Y. (2020). LizarMong: Excellent Key Encapsulation Mechanism Based on RLWE and RLWR. In: Seo, J. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2019. ICISC 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11975. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40921-0_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40921-0_13

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