Abstract
With the application domain extension and the in-depth research on physical unclonable function, the security of PUF has attracted more and more attention. Various attack methods have been emerged, among which side channel attacks have advantages in modeling PUF with non-linear structures. Based on the research of strong PUF attacks, this paper classifies the existing side channel analysis methods. According to the unified symbol rules, the principles of PUF error injection, reliability attack and power analysis are analyzed. Finally, the future development prospects of PUF side channel attacks are discussed.
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Li, Y., Shen, J., Liu, W., Zou, W. (2020). A Survey on Side-Channel Attacks of Strong PUF. In: Sun, X., Wang, J., Bertino, E. (eds) Artificial Intelligence and Security. ICAIS 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12240. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57881-7_7
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