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Private Identity Agreement for Private Set Functionalities

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Book cover Security and Cryptography for Networks (SCN 2020)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12238))

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Abstract

Private set intersection and related functionalities are among the most prominent real-world applications of secure multiparty computation. While such protocols have attracted significant attention from the research community, other functionalities are often required to support a PSI application in practice. For example, in order for two parties to run a PSI over the unique users contained in their databases, they might first invoke a support functionality to agree on the primary keys to represent their users.

This paper studies a secure approach to agreeing on primary keys. We introduce and realize a functionality that computes a common set of identifiers based on incomplete information held by two parties, which we refer to as private identity agreement, and we prove the security of our protocol in the honest-but-curious model. We explain the subtleties in designing such a functionality that arise from privacy requirements when intending to compose securely with PSI protocols. We also argue that the cost of invoking this functionality can be amortized over a large number of PSI sessions, and that for applications that require many repeated PSI executions, this represents an improvement over a PSI protocol that directly uses incomplete or fuzzy matches.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It is possible to establish \(\overset{\mathsf {user}}{\sim }\) for \(S_{1}\) and \(S_{2}\) for any binary relation that \(s_{1,j}\) and \(s_{2,k}\) may satisfy; however, we feel that equality is the most natural, and consider only equality in this work. We remark later to indicate when one could substitute another relation for equality in the construction.

  2. 2.

    In an application, the label would be the data that the vertex represents. Additionally, if the parties agree on an encoding scheme beforehand, types (address, zip, phone) can be encoded as part of a label at the cost of only a few bits.

  3. 3.

    If not using equality to compare the descriptors, then one could substitute any other comparison circuit to evaluate matching between two elements.

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Acknowledgement

We would like thank Samee Zahur for his assistance with the Obliv-C compiler and Jack Doerner for his assistance with Absentminded Crypto Kit.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Google, New York, NY, USA

    Ben Kreuter & Sarvar Patel

  2. UC Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

    Ben Terner

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  1. Ben Kreuter
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Correspondence to Ben Terner .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Università degli Studi di Salerno, Fisciano, Italy

    Clemente Galdi

  2. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

    Vladimir Kolesnikov

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Kreuter, B., Patel, S., Terner, B. (2020). Private Identity Agreement for Private Set Functionalities. In: Galdi, C., Kolesnikov, V. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12238. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_9

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