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Efficient Forward-Secure Threshold Signatures

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Advances in Information and Computer Security (IWSEC 2020)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12231))

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Abstract

Forward-secure threshold signatures are useful to mitigate the damage of secret key exposure. Constructions based on bilinear pairings are particularly interesting because they achieve shorter signatures than RSA-based constructions.

We construct a forward-secure threshold signature scheme based on bilinear pairings. Compared to existing schemes, our scheme is much more efficient since it has a non-interactive key update and signing procedure. Additionally, our scheme does not require a trusted dealer and has optimal resilience as well as small signatures. Our scheme is the first one which achieves all of these and that can also be implemented on standardized curves.

We prove our scheme EUF-CMA secure against adaptive malicious adversaries. Our technical approach is a combination of the forward-secure single user signature scheme by Drijvers and Neven with a slightly modified version of the distributed key generation protocol by Gennaro et al. This modified version allows the participating parties to adjust their secret key shares in a forward secure way.

R. Kurek—Supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement 802823, and by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the Collaborative Research Center “On-The-Fly Computing” (SFB 901/3).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The term “non-interactive” stems from the fact that users are able to deliver valid signature shares without interacting with each other. The communication round we count here is still there.

  2. 2.

    An adaptive adversary can corrupt the parties at any time. A malicious adversary is allowed to divert from the protocol in any possible fashion.

  3. 3.

    A mobile adversary can switch between the parties it corrupts. For a proper overview see [1].

  4. 4.

    Note that this case is only possible for time periods \(t> 0\), i.e. after KeyGen had finished. Else, the adversary would have no way to win the security experiment.

  5. 5.

    For comparison of the concrete sizes we refer to the common recommendations: https://www.keylength.com/.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Group of IT Security and Cryptography, University of Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany

    Rafael Kurek

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  1. Rafael Kurek
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Correspondence to Rafael Kurek .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Bunkyo University, Chigasaki, Japan

    Kazumaro Aoki

  2. Toho University, Funabashi, Japan

    Akira Kanaoka

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Kurek, R. (2020). Efficient Forward-Secure Threshold Signatures. In: Aoki, K., Kanaoka, A. (eds) Advances in Information and Computer Security. IWSEC 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12231. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58208-1_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58208-1_14

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