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Challenges of Securing and Defending Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

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National Cyber Summit (NCS) Research Track 2020 (NCS 2020)

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 1271))

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Abstract

There are increasing concerns that foreign manufactured unmanned aerial systems may leak sensitive data to their manufacturers, particularly since such systems are used for reconnaissance and surveillance of critical infrastructure, for monitoring/managing industrial incidents, for tracking terrorist attacks, and more generally in applications that involve homeland/national security. In this paper we investigate the challenges of securing and defending such systems, focusing on civilian Group 1 (small) drones (quadcopters). We propose a solution based on an architecture that complies with the policies and standards of the Committee on National Security Systems for the Cybersecurity of Unmanned National Systems CNSSP 28, in which software components are adapted/modified appropriately, and security policies/mechanisms are enforced. Protection builds on isolation, encapsulation, and the use of cryptographic tools, with performance constraints expressed in terms of computation (power) and latency.

M. Burmester–Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval Engineering Education Consortium and the Naval Surface Warfare Center.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The CRC for error detection of MAVLink 1.0 is not needed when HMACs are used.

  2. 2.

    One noisy drone can transmit several noisy signals.

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Acknowledgments

This material is based upon work supported by the Naval Engineering Education Consortium (NEEC) Award N00174-19-1-0006.

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Correspondence to Mike Burmester .

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Goble, W. et al. (2021). Challenges of Securing and Defending Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. In: Choo, KK.R., Morris, T., Peterson, G.L., Imsand, E. (eds) National Cyber Summit (NCS) Research Track 2020. NCS 2020. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1271. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58703-1_8

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