Abstract
To effectively trace the infection spread in a pandemic, a large number of manual contact tracers are required to reach out to all possible contacts of infected users. Exposure notification, a.k.a. digital contact tracing, can supplement manual contact tracing to ease the burden on manual tracers and to digitally obtain accurate contact information. We study how risk emerges in security, privacy, architecture, and technology aspects of exposure notification systems. We provide potential overhead in using Bluetooth-based systems and discuss the architectural support required for other types of systems, and we wrap up with a discussion on architecture aspects to support these solutions.
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This work was supported in part by NSF grant 1704176 and NSF grant 2028190.
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Krishnan, A.S., Yang, Y., Schaumont, P. (2020). Risk and Architecture Factors in Digital Exposure Notification. In: Orailoglu, A., Jung, M., Reichenbach, M. (eds) Embedded Computer Systems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simulation. SAMOS 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12471. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60939-9_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60939-9_21
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