Abstract
As a classic Cyber-Physical System (CPS), smart grids often suffer from various types of attacks, one of which the most threatening attacks is Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attack (CCPA). In order to improve the robustness of the smart grid under CCPA, two attack strategies are proposed to analyze the cascading failure of smart grids. Firstly, we define attack goals (AGs) function to identify important cyber and physical nodes as possible targets. Secondly, based on these targets, the algorithm of optimal attack and saturation attack strategy is designed and applied to CCPA for analyzing the effect of those attack strategies on smart grids. Finally, node loss is used as an evaluation index to compare the attack effect of CCPA, Cyber Attack (CA) and Physical Attack (PA). The experimental results show that when the same proportion of nodes are removed, the CCPA has more node losses than the CA and PA, regardless of based on the optimal attack strategy or the saturation attack strategy.
Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61501482, 61572514, 61903049 and 61702539, Scientific Research Fund of Hunan Provincial Education Department (19C0160 and 20B057), Open Fund of Key Laboratory of Hunan Province (2017TP1026), Hunan Key Laboratory Open Research Fund Project 2017TP1026, Hunan Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 2018JJ3611, Changsha Science and Technology Program (Grant K1705007) and NUDT Research Project under Grant No. ZK-18-03-47.
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© 2020 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Kang, W. (2020). Two Attacking Strategies of Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks for Cascading Failure Analysis in Smart Grid. In: Wang, X., Leung, V.C.M., Li, K., Zhang, H., Hu, X., Liu, Q. (eds) 6GN for Future Wireless Networks. 6GN 2020. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 337. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63941-9_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63941-9_29
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