Abstract
In this paper we show several quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (qCPAs) on contracting Feistel structures. In the classical setting, a d-branch r-round contracting Feistel structure can be shown to be PRP-secure when d is even and \(r \ge 2d-1\), meaning it is secure against polynomial-time chosen-plaintext attacks. We propose a polynomial-time qCPA distinguisher on the d-branch \((2d-1)\)-round contracting Feistel structure, which solves an open problem by Dong et al. In addition, we show a polynomial-time qCPA that recovers the keys of the d-branch r-round contracting Feistel structure when each round function \(F^{(i)}_{k_i}\) has the form \(F^{(i)}_{k_i}(x) = F_i(x \oplus k_i)\) for a public random function \(F_i\). This is applicable to the Chinese block cipher standard SM4, which is a special case where \(d=4\). Finally, in addition to quantum attacks under single-key setting, we also show related-key quantum attacks on balanced Feistel structures in the model that adversaries can only control part of the key difference in quantum superposition. Our related-key attacks on balanced Feistel structures can easily be extended to ones on contracting Feistel structures.
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Notes
- 1.
Feistel structures divide internal states into some words and update the states iteratively by applying word-wise operations. Each word is referred to as a branch and depicted as a single wire in the figures.
- 2.
In this work, we adopt the Feistel structure notation used in [14].
- 3.
A keyed permutation is said to be a secure PRP (resp., SPRP) if it cannot be distinguished from a random permutation by polynomial-time chosen-plaintext attacks (CPAs) (resp., chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCAs)).
- 4.
We note that a previous work [3] has shown a quantum attack on a contracting Feistel structure (GMiMC-crf), but the attack only works when all the round keys are identical.
- 5.
A previous work (Sect. 6.1 of [4]) does study a related-key attack in the quantum setting where an adversary can choose only a part of the differences on the key. However that attack does not make superposition queries to keyed oracles.
- 6.
Here, n denotes the branch size and the round key size.
- 7.
We can use any constant p such that \(0< p < 1\) as the threshold instead of 1/2. We use the value 1/2 just for convenience.
- 8.
The set of multiple periods of f forms a linear space because, if s and \(s'\) are periods of f, \(s \oplus s'\) is also a period of f.
- 9.
If f has multiple periods, we have to consider a generalization of (2’). See Section A.3 of this paper’s full version for details.
- 10.
It is desirable to show that the conjecture holds, but proving quantum query lower bounds is quite difficult when quantum queries are made to both of E and \(E^{-1}\).
- 11.
The previous polynomial-time qCPA on 3-round Feistel-KF structure [7] recovers the keys without nested Simon’s algorithm.
- 12.
To be more precise, we have to simulate \(\mathcal {O}^7_A\) (truncation) by using \(\mathcal {O}^7\). This can be done by using the technique explained in Remark 1.
- 13.
Here, we assume it to be the same public function for all rounds. In fact, every round can be an arbitrary public function and the attack still works.
- 14.
To be more precise, the conditions become equivalent with an overwhelming probability when the round function F is a random function.
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Acknowledgement
This work was initiated during the group sessions of the 9th Asian Workshop on Symmetric Key Cryptography (ASK 2019) held in Kobe, Japan. Yunwen Liu is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.61902414) and Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province (No. 2020JJ5667).
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Cid, C., Hosoyamada, A., Liu, Y., Sim, S.M. (2020). Quantum Cryptanalysis on Contracting Feistel Structures and Observation on Related-Key Settings. In: Bhargavan, K., Oswald, E., Prabhakaran, M. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2020. INDOCRYPT 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12578. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65277-7_17
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