Abstract
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) provide means to generate chip individual keys, especially for low-cost applications such as the Internet of Things (IoT). They are intrinsically robust against reverse engineering, and more cost-effective than non-volatile memory (NVM). For several PUF primitives, countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate side-channel weaknesses. However, most mitigation techniques require substantial design effort and/or complexity overhead, which cannot be tolerated in low-cost IoT scenarios. In this paper, we first analyze side-channel vulnerabilities of the Loop PUF, an area efficient PUF implementation with a configurable delay path based on a single ring oscillator (RO). We provide side-channel analysis (SCA) results from power and electromagnetic measurements. We confirm that oscillation frequencies are easily observable and distinguishable, breaking the security of unprotected Loop PUF implementations. Second, we present a low-cost countermeasure based on temporal masking to thwart SCA that requires only one bit of randomness per PUF response bit. The randomness is extracted from the PUF itself creating a self-secured PUF. The concept is highly effective regarding security, low complexity, and low design constraints making it ideal for applications like IoT. Finally, we discuss trade-offs of side-channel resistance, reliability, and latency as well as the transfer of the countermeasure to other RO-based PUFs.
This work was partly funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research in the project SecForCARs under grant number 01KIS0795 and under the SPARTA project, which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 830892.
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Notes
- 1.
An additional attack vector is the enhancement of the frequency leakage by leakage of the helper data and the error-correcting code that would allow for setting up a system of linear equations to retain the individual delays of the Loop PUF. However, the entire attack surface could only be considered, if the complete PUF architecture was evaluated and we focus on the primitive only.
- 2.
Note that technically, the smallest frequency that can be resolved is 0 Hz, i.e., the DC component. However, in Eq. (6) we are concerned with the observable frequencies.
- 3.
Note, that the reordering of measurements does not affect PUF quality metrics as it has not effect on the oscillation frequency.
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Tebelmann, L., Danger, JL., Pehl, M. (2021). Self-secured PUF: Protecting the Loop PUF by Masking. In: Bertoni, G.M., Regazzoni, F. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12244. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68773-1_14
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