Abstract
We demonstrate two fault based key recovery attacks – a bit-flipping fault attack, and a random fault attack, on the authenticated encryption stream cipher TRIAD. The attacks discussed in this paper are applicable mainly due to the simplicity of the TRIAD keystream function during the first few hundred rounds. We investigated the algebraic normal form (ANF) of the first 160 output keystream bits of TRIAD. The ANF of these output keystream bits shows specific patterns that are used in our fault attacks. We first use these patterns with a bit-flipping fault model combined with solving a system of low degree algebraic equations that requires 85 faults to recover the secret key of TRIAD, with a data complexity of \(2^{7.43}\). We then relax our assumptions by using a random fault model. The random fault model described in this paper is also combined with solving a system of low degree algebraic equations and requires on average 170 faults to recover the secret key of TRIAD with a data complexity of \(2^{8.01}\). For both of the attacks, the complexity of solving the low degree algebraic equations is negligible. We have not performed experiments on the actual hardware implementation, but we have verified all the attacks using simulation on TRIAD software implementation.
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Acknowledgements
This research is supported by Xiamen University Malaysia Research Fund (Grant No: XMUMRF/2019-C3/IECE/0005).
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Salam, I., Law, K.Y., Xue, L., Yau, WC. (2021). Differential Fault Based Key Recovery Attacks on TRIAD. In: Hong, D. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2020. ICISC 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12593. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68890-5_15
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