Abstract
The potential development of large-scale quantum computers is raising concerns among IT and security research professionals due to their ability to solve (elliptic curve) discrete logarithm and integer factorization problems in polynomial time. All currently used, public-key cryptography algorithms would be deemed insecure in a Post-quantum setting. In response, the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology has initiated a process to standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, focusing primarily on their security guarantees. Additionally, the Internet Engineering Task Force has published two quantum-secure signature schemes and has been looking into adding quantum-resistant algorithms in protocols. In this work, we investigate two post-quantum, hash-based signature schemes published by the Internet Engineering Task Force and submitted to the National Institute of Standards and Technology for use in secure boot. We evaluate various parameter sets for the use-cases in question and we prove that Post-quantum signatures would not have material impact on image signing. We also study the hierarchical design of these signatures in different scenarios of hardware secure boot.
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Scott Fluhrer for his LMS code, his optimizations and his valuable guidance and feedback. The authors would also like to thank Jason Moore and Jim Wesselkamper from Xilinx for their sample Xilinx design data points included in this work. The LMS FPGA logic measurements were based on code developed by Md Mahbub Alam, a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Florida at the time. Thanks to Bruno Couillard and Jim Goodman from Crypto4A for the interesting discussions about HBS and their feedback. Finally, we would like to acknowledge Joost Rijneveld for his feedback and comments regarding \({\text {SPHINCS}^+}\) parameters and the \({\text {SPHINCS}^+}\) implementation and Dimitrios Sikeridis for his help with the experiments.
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Kampanakis, P., Panburana, P., Curcio, M., Shroff, C. (2021). Post-quantum Hash-Based Signatures for Secure Boot. In: Park, Y., Jadav, D., Austin, T. (eds) Silicon Valley Cybersecurity Conference. SVCC 2020. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1383. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72725-3_5
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