Abstract
We study the problem of election control through social influence when the manipulator is allowed to use the locations that she acquired on the network for sending both positive and negative messages on multiple candidates, widely extending the previous results available in the literature that study the influence of a single message on a single candidate. In particular, we provide a tight characterization of the settings in which the maximum increase in the margin of victory can be efficiently approximated and of those in which any approximation turns out to be impossible.
This work has been partially supported by the Italian MIUR PRIN 2017 Project ALGADIMAR “Algorithms, Games, and Digital Market”.
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Castiglioni, M., Ferraioli, D., Gatti, N., Landriani, G. (2021). Election Manipulation on Social Networks with Messages on Multiple Candidates Extended Abstract. In: Heintz, F., Milano, M., O'Sullivan, B. (eds) Trustworthy AI - Integrating Learning, Optimization and Reasoning. TAILOR 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12641. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73959-1_18
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