Abstract
Belief revision is a hallmark of knowledge representation, logic, and philosophy. However, despite the extensive research in the area, we believe a fresh take on belief revision is needed. To that end, it is our conviction that believing a piece of information depends on trust in information sources that conveyed said piece and that trust in information sources is affected by changes in beliefs. Trust is also an impress of philosophy and all time favorite of psychology and multi-agent systems. Hence, many approaches were developed for trust representation, yet, in isolation from belief revision. While admittedly crucial to a realistic treatment of belief revision, trust revision, to our dismay, did not receive the same level of attention. In this paper, we argue that a formal treatment for the joint interdependent revision of belief and trust is called for. Moreover, we propose a new framework called information revision that captures the joint revision of belief and trust. Further, we provide postulates that govern such process of revision. Finally, we provide a class of operators called relevant change propagation operators and provide their representation theorem.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
\(\mathcal {D}_b\) and \(\mathcal {D}_t\) are usually the same; however, a qualitative account of trust and belief might have different sets for grading the two attitudes.
- 3.
Information states contain trust bases and histories to model languages where trust and conveyance are part of the object language as well as those which do not have trust and conveyance as part of the object language.
- 4.
Thus, relevance is the reflexive, symmetric, transitive closure of E.
- 5.
Due to space limitations, we were not able to provide most of our results and all proofs in this paper. However, the main proofs could be found in this online appendix: proofs.
- 6.
If a formula is relevant to \(\lnot \phi \) directly and not just to a formula in a kernel of \(\lnot \phi \), the postulate still holds because \(\{\lnot \phi \}\) is trivially a \(\lnot \phi \)-kernel.
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Yasser, A., Ismail, H.O. (2021). Trust Is All You Need: From Belief Revision to Information Revision. In: Faber, W., Friedrich, G., Gebser, M., Morak, M. (eds) Logics in Artificial Intelligence. JELIA 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12678. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75775-5_5
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