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Which E-Voting Problems Do We Need to Solve?

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Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2021 (CRYPTO 2021)

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  1. 1.

    CoI statement: I have received money from this process. Nevertheless the fact that they pay people like us to help them improve their legislation indicates that they are making decisions in a better way than most other authorities.

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Acknowledgement

I would like to thank all my coauthors over the years for making voting research so interesting and rewarding.

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Correspondence to Vanessa Teague .

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Teague, V. (2021). Which E-Voting Problems Do We Need to Solve?. In: Malkin, T., Peikert, C. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2021. CRYPTO 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12825. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84242-0_1

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