Abstract
Ridesharing, as an emerging efficient solution for transportation congestion, has achieved great business success in recent years. A critical issue in the ridesharing system is to determine a group of passengers to share a ride and the corresponding payments to charge them to cover the cost of drivers. We present the desired properties of a cost-sharing mechanism in ridesharing systems, namely economic efficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance. However, the existing classic mechanisms do not achieve these properties even in a simple case. In this work, we formulate a cost-sharing model for ridesharing systems, and design two VCG-based mechanisms for the simple case and the general case, respectively. The simple case can capture the ridesharing problem with a symmetric cost function, while the general case describes a more general ridesharing problem with a submodular cost function. We theoretically demonstrate that these two mechanisms are approximately economic efficient with other desirable properties guaranteed. Finally, we evaluate the proposed mechanisms on a real-world dataset. The evaluation results show that our mechanism could increase the user experience of passengers as well as the efficiency of the ridesharing system.
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Notes
- 1.
Please refer to Sect. 2 for the detailed definitions.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by National Key R&D Program of China No. 2019YFB2102200, in part by China NSF grant No. 62025204, 62072303, 61972252, and 61972254, in part by Alibaba Group through Alibaba Innovation Research Program, and in part by Tencent Rhino Bird Key Research Project. The opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies or the government.
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Liu, Y., Zhang, C., Zheng, Z., Chen, G. (2021). Cost-Sharing Mechanism Design for Social Cost Minimization in Ridesharing Systems. In: Liu, Z., Wu, F., Das, S.K. (eds) Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications. WASA 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12938. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86130-8_22
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