Abstract
Licensed shared access is a new sharing concept that allows Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) to share the 2.3–2.4 GHz bandwidth with its owner. This sharing can be done after obtaining a license from the regulator. The allocation is made among groups such that two base stations in the same group can use the same spectrum simultaneously. In this context, different auction schemes were proposed, however they are all one-shot auctions. In this paper, we propose an ascending implementation of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG) when the regulator has K identical blocks of spectrum to allocate. The implementation is based on the clinching auction. Ascending auctions are more transparent than one-shot auctions because bidders see the evolution of the auction. In addition, ascending auctions preserve privacy because bidders do not reveal necessarily their valuations.
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Chouayakh, A., Bechler, A., Amigo, I., Nuaymi, L., Maillé, P. (2021). An Ascending Implementation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for the Licensed Shared Access. In: Lasaulce, S., Mertikopoulos, P., Orda, A. (eds) Network Games, Control and Optimization. NETGCOOP 2021. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1354. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87473-5_9
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