Abstract
The immutability of blockchain means that data in blockchain cannot be modified once confirmed. It guarantees the reliability and integrity of blockchain. However, absolute immutability is not conducive to timely correction of blockchain. Currently, there are some researches on redactable blockchain. They replaced hash functions with chameleon hash functions or proposed policy-based chameleon hashes, which may lead to the centralization of redaction right or single point of failure.
We propose a multi-authority policy-based chameleon hash by combining chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors and multi-authority attribute-based encryption, and prove its security. Users who satisfy the access policies can perform modification operations while the rest have no permission. In addition, we give a proof-of-concept implementation of a redactable blockchain, building on Hyperledger Fabric source code. It only requires minimal changes to the current transaction structure and hash computation, etc. Our results show that the latency is still in millisecond with 20000 concurrent redactable transactions.
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Acknowledgment
This work is supported in part by the National Key R&D Program of China (2017YFB1400702), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61972017), the National Cryptography Development Fund (MMJJ20180215) and the Beijing Natural Science Foundation (M21033).
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A Data Structure Modifications in HLF
A Data Structure Modifications in HLF
In this section, we analyze the underlying data structure of Hyperledger Fabric and our modifications to its transaction structure.
The Block and Transaction Structure in Hyperledger Fabric
Our analysis is shown in Fig. 5. Note that the data structures of some objects are not listed in detail due to limited space, i.e., \(\texttt {ChannelHeader}\) consists of \(\texttt {Type}\), \(\texttt {TxID}\), \(\texttt {Timestamp}\), etc., and \(\texttt {SignatureHeader}\) composes of \(\texttt {Nonce}\) and \(\texttt {Creator}\). Our modification have been marked in green (\(\texttt {PRP}\) and \(\texttt {Payload}\)) and the newly added data structure is orange (\(\texttt {ChamHash}\)). \(\texttt {ChamHash}\) contains a [ ]\(\texttt {byte}\) type \(\texttt {Hashvalue}\), a [ ]\(\texttt {byte}\) type \(\texttt {Randomvalue}\) and a [ ]\(\mathsf {byte}\) type \(\texttt {Etdcipher}\) as defined in MAPCH in Sect. 3.2.
As for \(\texttt {PRP}\), \(\texttt {ProposalHash}\) is the hash of the concentation of (i) the serialized \(\texttt {ChannelHeader}\) object, (ii) the serialized \(\texttt {SignatureHeader}\) object, and (iii) the part of \(\texttt {ChaincodeProposalPayload}\) (without the transient data). Additionaly, \(\texttt {Endorsement}\) is the signature of \(\texttt {PRP}\). If we update the transaction content \(\texttt {Input}\) (i.e., the parameters called by the chaincode), \(\texttt {ProposalHash}\) and \(\texttt {Endorsement}\) will be changed, too. So we added \(\texttt {ChamHash}\) to maintain the correctness of endorsement process.
The reason for modifying \(\texttt {Payload}\) structure is similar to the above. \(\texttt {Signature}\) is the signature of \(\texttt {Payload}\) in an \(\texttt {Envelop}\). The update of \(\texttt {Input}\) will lead to the change of \(\texttt {Payload}\). Therefore, we added \(\texttt {ChamHash}\) in order to keep the signature unchanged.
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Zhang, Z., Li, T., Wang, Z., Liu, J. (2021). Redactable Transactions in Consortium Blockchain: Controlled by Multi-authority CP-ABE. In: Baek, J., Ruj, S. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13083. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90567-5_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90567-5_21
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