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Bigdata-Facilitated Two-Party Authenticated Key Exchange for IoT

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Information Security (ISC 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 13118))

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Abstract

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols, by definition, guarantee both session key secrecy and entity authentication. Informally, session key secrecy means that only the legitimate parties learn the established key and mutual authentication means that one party can assure itself the session key is actually established with the other party. Today, an important application area for AKE is Internet of Things (IoT) systems, where an IoT device runs the protocol to establish a session key with a remote server. In this paper, we identify two additional security requirements for IoT-oriented AKE, namely Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) resilience and Server Compromise Impersonation (SCI) resilience. These properties provide an additional layer of security when the IoT device and the server get compromised respectively. Inspired by Chan et al.’s bigdata-based unilateral authentication protocol, we propose a novel AKE protocol which achieves mutual authentication, session key secrecy (including perfect forward secrecy), and the above two resilience properties. To demonstrate its practicality, we implement our protocol and show that one execution costs about 15.19 ms (or, 84.73 ms) for the IoT device and 2.44 ms (or, 12.51 ms) for the server for security parameter \(\lambda =128\) (or, \(\lambda =256\)). We finally propose an enhanced protocol to reduce the computational complexity on the end of IoT by outsourcing an exponentiation computation to the server. By instantiating the signature scheme with NIST’s round three alternate candidate Picnic, we show that one protocol execution costs about 14.44 ms (or, 58.45 ms) for the IoT device and 12.78 ms (or, 46.34 ms) for the server for security parameter \(\lambda =128\) (or, \(\lambda =256\)).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Source code is available at https://github.com/n00d1e5/Demo_Bigdata-facilitated_Two-party_AKE_for_IoT.

  2. 2.

    Source code of both schemes picnic-L1-full for 128-bit security and picnic-L5-full for 256-bit security is available at https://github.com/IAIK/Picnic.

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Acknowledgement

This paper is supported in the context of the project CATALYST funded by Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg (FNR, reference 12186579).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology (LIST), 5 Avenue des Hauts-Fourneaux, 4362, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg

    Bowen Liu & Qiang Tang

  2. Singapore University of Technology and Design, 8 Somapah Road, Singapore, 487372, Singapore

    Jianying Zhou

Authors
  1. Bowen Liu
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  2. Qiang Tang
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Correspondence to Bowen Liu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia

    Joseph K. Liu

  2. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Gjøvik, Norway

    Sokratis Katsikas

  3. Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark

    Weizhi Meng

  4. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Willy Susilo

  5. Petra Christian University, Surabaya, Indonesia

    Rolly Intan

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Liu, B., Tang, Q., Zhou, J. (2021). Bigdata-Facilitated Two-Party Authenticated Key Exchange for IoT. In: Liu, J.K., Katsikas, S., Meng, W., Susilo, W., Intan, R. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13118. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91356-4_6

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