Abstract
We study the routing decisions of passengers in a transportation station, where various types of facilities arrive with limited seating availability. The passengers’ arrivals occur according to a Poisson process, the arriving instants of the transportation facilities form independent renewal processes and the seating availability at the successive visits of the facilities correspond to independent random variables, identically distributed for each facility. We analyze the strategic passenger behavior and derive the equilibrium strategies. We also discuss the associated social welfare optimization problem.
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Acknowledgement
D. Logothetis was supported by the Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation (HFRI) under the HFRI PhD Fellowship grant (Fellowship Number: 1158.). We cordially thank the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive remarks on the initial revision of the paper.
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Logothetis, D., Economou, A. (2021). Routing of Strategic Passengers in a Transportation Station. In: Ballarini, P., Castel, H., Dimitriou, I., Iacono, M., Phung-Duc, T., Walraevens, J. (eds) Performance Engineering and Stochastic Modeling. EPEW ASMTA 2021 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13104. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91825-5_19
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