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Efficient Scalable Multi-party Private Set Intersection Using Oblivious PRF

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Security and Trust Management (STM 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 13075))

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a concretely efficient protocol for private set intersection (PSI) in the multi-party setting using oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF). In fact, we generalize the approach used in the work of Chase and Miao [CRYPTO 2020] towards deploying a lightweight multi-point OPRF construction for two-party PSI. Our protocol only includes oblivious transfer (OT) extension and garbled Bloom filter as its main ingredients and avoids computationally expensive operations. From a communication pattern perspective, the protocol consists of two types of interactions. The first type is performed over a star-like communication graph in which one designated party interacts with all other parties via performing OTs as the sender. Besides, parties communicate through a path-like communication graph that involves sending a garbled Bloom filter from the first party to its neighboring party following the last one. This design makes our protocol to be highly scalable due to the independence of each party’s complexity from the number of participating parties and thus causes a communication and computation complexities of \(O(n\lambda k)\), where n is the set size, k is the number of hash functions, and \(\lambda \) is the security parameter. Moreover, the asymptotic complexity of the designated party is \(O(tn\lambda )\) which linearly scales with the number of parties t. We prove security of the proposed protocol against semi-honest adversaries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Although to perform OT one needs to use public-key operations, in [Ish+03] a method was introduced which enables to do quite a large number of OTs utilizing only efficient symmetric-key primitives.

  2. 2.

    One can think of n as the upper bound on set sizes.

  3. 3.

    Augmented semi-honest security is a weaker notion than semi-honest security. We consider the optimized version of the protocol which tries to load balance the interactions between pairs of parties at the cost of some security relaxations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

    Alireza Kavousi

  2. Electronics Research Institute, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

    Javad Mohajeri & Mahmoud Salmasizadeh

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  1. Alireza Kavousi
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  2. Javad Mohajeri
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  3. Mahmoud Salmasizadeh
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Correspondence to Alireza Kavousi .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Málaga, Málaga, Spain

    Rodrigo Roman

  2. Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore, Singapore

    Jianying Zhou

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Kavousi, A., Mohajeri, J., Salmasizadeh, M. (2021). Efficient Scalable Multi-party Private Set Intersection Using Oblivious PRF. In: Roman, R., Zhou, J. (eds) Security and Trust Management. STM 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13075. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91859-0_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91859-0_5

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