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Pay-for-Performance and Emerging Search Behavior: When Exploration Serves to Reduce Alterations

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Advances in Social Simulation

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Abstract

Prior research suggests that the fit between task complexity and incentive schemes like pay-for-performance positively affects organizational performance. This study goes a step further and seeks to investigate how different types of pay-for-performance affect subordinates’ search behavior for novel solutions to complex decision problems. Based on NK fitness landscapes, the study employs an agent-based simulation with subordinate decision-makers individually adapting their search behavior via reinforcement learning. The results suggest that the emerging search strategy is subtly shaped by the (mis-)fit between task complexity and incentive structure. In particular, the results indicate that search behavior may arise for different “reasons” ranging from fostering new solutions to even preventing alterations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, in the “standard” hidden action model of principal-agent theory, both contracting parties know the entire space of possible effort levels which the agent could employ [10]. Hence, particular search processes to discover new options within the solution space are not required [11, with further references].

  2. 2.

    Unit head r remembers the compensation resulting from the status quo \(\mathbf {d}^{r*}_{t-1}\), and, from this, can infer its actual performance \({P}^{r}_{t}\) if the status quo is kept.

  3. 3.

    \(0\le p^r(s^a,t) \le 1\) and \(\sum _{s^a\in S} (p^r(s^a,t))=1\) apply to probabilities \(p^r(s^a,t)\).

  4. 4.

    Pretests indicated that the results do not principally change for a longer observation period. The similar holds for longer learning intervals (e.g., \(T^L=20\)); however, shortening the learning period notably below ten periods does not leave the search strategies “enough time” to unfold their particular potential.

  5. 5.

    The term “cluster” is employed to indicate a group of simulation runs which show a similar combination of units’ search strategies in the last observation period. The term is not used in terms of a cluster analysis.

  6. 6.

    An extensive analysis including average number and performance of local peaks of numerous interaction structures based on the NK framework is provided in [22].

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Wall, F. (2022). Pay-for-Performance and Emerging Search Behavior: When Exploration Serves to Reduce Alterations. In: Czupryna, M., Kamiński, B. (eds) Advances in Social Simulation. Springer Proceedings in Complexity. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92843-8_9

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