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Facial Recognition for Remote Electronic Voting – Missing Piece of the Puzzle or Yet Another Liability?

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Emerging Technologies for Authorization and Authentication (ETAA 2021)

Abstract

Reliable voter identification is one of the key requirements to guarantee eligibility and uniformity of elections. In a remote setting, this task becomes more complicated compared to voter identification at a physical polling station. In case strong cryptographic mechanisms are not available, biometrics is one of the available alternatives to consider. In this paper, we take a closer look at facial recognition as a possible remote voter identification measure. We cover technical aspects of facial recognition relevant to voting, discuss the main architectural decisions, and analyse some of the remaining open problems, including dispute resolution and privacy issues.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-ceo-tim-cook-on-voting-technology-iphones-smartphones-2021-4.

  2. 2.

    https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt11.html.

  3. 3.

    https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/political-landscape/afghanistans-2019-election-23-disputed-biometric-votes-endanger-election-results/.

  4. 4.

    https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/telangana-state-election-commission-successfully-tests-facial-recognition-technique/article30627812.ece.

  5. 5.

    https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/managing-elections-under-covid-19-pandemic-conditions-the-case-of-ghana.pdf.

  6. 6.

    The Estonian i-voting system also requires voters to explicitly authenticate themselves before they are allowed to sign their ballots.

  7. 7.

    https://www.vice.com/en/article/dyzykz/detroit-police-chief-facial-recognition-software-misidentifies-96-of-the-time.

  8. 8.

    https://www.rferl.org/a/biometrics-to-end-fraud-in-afghan-election-may-discourage-some-women-from-voting/30131049.html.

  9. 9.

    https://www.logitech.com/assets/41349/logitech--why-a-better-webcam-matters.ENG.pdf.

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Acknowledgements

This paper has been supported by the Estonian Research Council under grant number PRG920. The authors are grateful to the Estonian Information System Authority and State Electoral Office for their support of the research process.

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Heiberg, S., Krips, K., Willemson, J., Vinkel, P. (2021). Facial Recognition for Remote Electronic Voting – Missing Piece of the Puzzle or Yet Another Liability?. In: Saracino, A., Mori, P. (eds) Emerging Technologies for Authorization and Authentication. ETAA 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13136. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93747-8_6

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