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Post-quantum Anonymous One-Sided Authenticated Key Exchange Without Random Oracles

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Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2022 (PKC 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 13178))

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Abstract

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) is a cryptographic protocol to share a common session key among multiple parties. Usually, PKI-based AKE schemes are designed to guarantee secrecy of the session key and mutual authentication. However, in practice, there are many cases where mutual authentication is undesirable such as in anonymous networks like Tor and Riffle, or difficult to achieve due to the certificate management at the user level such as the Internet. Goldberg et al. formulated a model of anonymous one-sided AKE which guarantees the anonymity of the client by allowing only the client to authenticate the server, and proposed a concrete scheme. However, existing anonymous one-sided AKE schemes are only known to be secure in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose generic constructions of anonymous one-sided AKE in the random oracle model and in the standard model, respectively. Our constructions allow us to construct the first post-quantum anonymous one-sided AKE scheme from isogenies in the standard model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ibaraki University, 4-12-1, Nakanarusawacho, Hitachi-shi, Ibaraki, 316-8511, Japan

    Ren Ishibashi & Kazuki Yoneyama

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  1. Ren Ishibashi
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  2. Kazuki Yoneyama
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Correspondence to Ren Ishibashi .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Tokyo, Japan

    Goichiro Hanaoka

  2. Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan

    Junji Shikata

  3. The University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, Japan

    Yohei Watanabe

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Ishibashi, R., Yoneyama, K. (2022). Post-quantum Anonymous One-Sided Authenticated Key Exchange Without Random Oracles. In: Hanaoka, G., Shikata, J., Watanabe, Y. (eds) Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2022. PKC 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13178. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97131-1_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97131-1_2

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