Abstract
To prevent users from using Tor for anonymous communication, many regulatory agencies have blocked the IP addresses of public Tor routers in Tor networks, resulting in the interception of traffic to Tor public routers. Existing research solves this problem by introducing bridge nodes into the Tor network to avoid supervision: The bridge node is usually the entrance node of the Tor network, and its information is not completely public on the network, so it cannot be intercepted completely. This allows anonymous users to access the Tor network through the bridge node, which can effectively avoid Tor censorship. Nevertheless, many studies still focus on the discovery of Tor bridge nodes. The technology of bridge node discovery in Tor networks within recent years is summarized in this paper.
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Yu, F., Zhou, R., Zhai, X., Qu, Y., Fei, G. (2022). Survey on Bridge Discovery in Tor. In: Bao, W., Yuan, X., Gao, L., Luan, T.H., Choi, D.B.J. (eds) Ad Hoc Networks and Tools for IT. ADHOCNETS TridentCom 2021 2021. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 428. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98005-4_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98005-4_23
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