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Improved Attacks on GIFT-64

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Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13203))

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Abstract

One of the well-known superiorities of GIFT-64 over PRESENT lies in the correction of the strong linear hull effect. However, apart from the investigation of the 9-round linear hull effect in the design document, we find no linear attack result on GIFT-64. Although we do not doubt the security of GIFT-64 regarding the linear cryptanalysis, the actual resistance of the cipher to the linear attack should be evaluated since it promotes a comprehensive perception of the soundness of GIFT-64. Motivated by this observation, we implement an automatic search and find a 12-round linear distinguisher whose dominating trail is an optimal linear characteristic. Following that, the first 19-round linear attack is launched by utilising the newly identified distinguisher. On the other side, we notice that the previous differential attack of GIFT-64 covering 20 rounds claims the entire codebook. To reduce the data complexity of the 20-round attack, we apply the automatic method to exhaustively check 13-round differential trails with probabilities no less than \(2^{-64}\) and identify multiple 13-round differentials facilitating 20-round attacks without using the full codebook. One of the candidate differentials with the maximum probability and the minimum number of guessed subkey bits is then employed to realise the first 20-round differential attack without relying on the complete codebook. Given the newly obtained results, we conjecture that the resistances of GIFT-64 against differential and linear attacks do not have a significant gap. Also, we note that the attack results in this paper are far from threatening the security of GIFT-64.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/lightweight-cryptography.

  2. 2.

    \(\mathbb {R}\) stands for the rational number field.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the shepherd Kalikinkar Mandal and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions to improve the quality of the paper. The authors also would like to thank Yong Fu for the kind discussion. The research leading to these results has received funding from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 62002201, Grant No. 62032014), the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant No. 2018YFA0704702), the Major Scientific and Technological Innovation Project of Shandong Province, China (Grant No. 2019JZZY010133), the Major Basic Research Project of Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province, China (Grant No. ZR202010220025), and the Qingdao Postdoctor Application Research Project (Grant No. 61580070311101).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China

    Ling Sun, Wei Wang & Meiqin Wang

  2. State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P. O. Box 5159, Beijing, 100878, China

    Ling Sun

  3. School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China

    Ling Sun, Wei Wang & Meiqin Wang

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  1. Ling Sun
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Correspondence to Meiqin Wang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada

    Riham AlTawy

  2. Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Andreas Hülsing

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Sun, L., Wang, W., Wang, M. (2022). Improved Attacks on GIFT-64. In: AlTawy, R., Hülsing, A. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13203. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99277-4_12

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