Abstract
The Even-Mansour cipher is a simple method for constructing a (keyed) pseudorandom permutation E from a public random permutation \(P:\{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\). It is secure against classical attacks, with optimal attacks requiring \(q_E\) queries to E and \(q_P\) queries to P such that \(q_E \cdot q_P \approx 2^n\). If the attacker is given quantum access to both E and P, however, the cipher is completely insecure, with attacks using \(q_E, q_P = O(n)\) queries known.
In any plausible real-world setting, however, a quantum attacker would have only classical access to the keyed permutation E implemented by honest parties, while retaining quantum access to P. Attacks in this setting with \(q_E \cdot q_P^2 \approx 2^n\) are known, showing that security degrades as compared to the purely classical case, but leaving open the question as to whether the Even-Mansour cipher can still be proven secure in that natural, “post-quantum” setting.
We resolve this question, showing that any attack in that setting requires \(q_E \cdot q^2_P + q_P \cdot q_E^2 \approx 2^n\). Our results apply to both the two-key and single-key variants of Even-Mansour. Along the way, we establish several generalizations of results from prior work on quantum-query lower bounds that may be of independent interest.
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Notes
- 1.
While our bound is tight with respect to the number of queries, it is loose with regard to the attacker’s advantage, as both the BHT and offline Simon algorithms achieve advantage \(\varTheta (q_P^2q_E\big /2^{n})\). Reducing this gap is an interesting open question.
- 2.
We assume for simplicity that this query is in the forward direction, but the case where it is in the inverse direction can be handled entirely symmetrically (using the fact that the marginal distribution of \(k_2\) is uniform). The strings \(s_0\) and \(s_1\) are in that case replaced by \(P_b(s_0)\) and \(P_b(s_1)\). See Appendix B.2 for details.
- 3.
This lemma is an information-theoretic result, and can be applied in our setting since everything we say in what follows holds even if \({\mathcal A}\) is given the entire function table for its quantum oracle Q in line 12.
- 4.
This can be done by having a register serve as a counter that is incremented with each application of \(\varPhi \).
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Acknowledgments
The authors thank Andrew Childs, Bibhusa Rawal, and Patrick Struck for useful discussions. Work of Jonathan Katz was supported in part by financial assistance award 70NANB19H126 from the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology. Work of Christian Majenz was funded by a NWO VENI grant (Project No. VI.Veni.192.159). Gorjan Alagic acknowledges support from the U.S. Army Research Office under Grant Number W911NF-20-1-0015, the U.S. Department of Energy under Award Number DE-SC0020312, and the AFOSR under Award Number FA9550-20-1-0108.
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Appendices
A Security of Forward-Only Even-Mansour
In this section we consider a simpler case, where \(E_k[F](x) := F(x \oplus k)\) for \(F:\{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\) a uniform function and k a uniform n-bit string. Here we restrict the adversary to forward queries only, i.e., the adversary has classical access to \(E_k[F]\) and quantum access to F; note that \(E^{-1}_k[F]\) and \(F^{-1}\) may not even be well-defined. This setting was also analyzed by Jaeger et al. [16] using different techniques.
We let \(\mathcal {F}_n\) denote the set of all functions from \(\{0,1\}^n\) to \(\{0,1\}^n\).
Theorem 4
Let \({\mathcal A}\) be a quantum algorithm making \(q_E\) classical queries to its first oracle and \(q_F\) quantum queries to its second oracle. Then

Proof
We make the same assumptions about \({\mathcal A}\) as in the initial paragraphs of the proof of Theorem 3. We also adopt analogous notation for the stages of \({\mathcal A}\), now using \(q_E\), \(q_F\), and \(q_{F, j}\) as appropriate.
Given a function \(F : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\), a set T of pairs where any \(x \in \{0,1\}^n\) is the first element of at most one pair in T, and a key \(k \in \{0,1\}^n\), we define the function \(F_{T, k}:\{0,1\}^n\rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\) as
Note that, in contrast to the analogous definition in Theorem 3, here the order of the tuples in T does not matter and so we may take it to be a set. Note also that we are redefining the notation \(F_{T, k}\) from how it was used in Theorem 3; this notation applies to this appendix only.
We now define a sequence of experiments \({\mathbf {H}}_j\), for \(j=0, \ldots , q_E\):
Experiment \({\mathbf {H}}_j\). Sample \(R, F \leftarrow \mathcal {F}_n\) and \(k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n\). Then:
-
1.
Run \({\mathcal A}\), answering its classical queries using R and its quantum queries using F, stopping immediately before its \((j+1)\)st classical query. Let \(T_j = \{(x_1, y_1), \dots , (x_j, y_j)\}\) be the set of all classical queries made by \({\mathcal A}\) thus far and their corresponding responses.
-
2.
For the remainder of the execution of \({\mathcal A}\), answer its classical queries using \(E_k[F]\) and its quantum queries using \(F_{T_j, k}\).
We can represent \({\mathbf {H}}_j\) as the experiment in which \({\mathcal A}\)’s queries are answered using the oracle sequence
Note that \({\mathbf {H}}_0\) is exactly the real world (i.e., \({\mathcal A}^{E_k[F], F}\)) and \({\mathbf {H}}_{q_E}\) is exactly the ideal world (i.e., \({\mathcal A}^{R, F}\).)
For \(j=0, \ldots , q_E-1\), we define an additional experiment \({\mathbf {H}}_j'\):
Experiment \({\mathbf {H}}_j'\). Sample \(R, F \leftarrow \mathcal {F}_n\) and \(k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n\). Then:
-
1.
Run \({\mathcal A}\), answering its classical queries using R and its quantum queries using F, stopping immediately after its \((j+1)\)st classical query. Let \(T_{j+1} = \big ((x_1, y_1), \dots , (x_{j+1}, y_{j+1})\big )\) be the set of all classical queries made by \({\mathcal A}\) thus far and their corresponding responses.
-
2.
For the remainder of the execution of \({\mathcal A}\), answer its classical queries using \(E_k[F]\) and its quantum queries using \(F_{T_{j+1}, k}\).
I.e., \({\mathbf {H}}'_j\) corresponds to answering \({\mathcal A}\)’s queries using the oracle sequence
We now show that \({\mathbf {H}}_j'\) is close to \({\mathbf {H}}_{j+1}\) and \({\mathbf {H}}_j\) is close to \({\mathbf {H}}_j'\) for \(0 \le j < q_E\).
Lemma 9
For \(j=0, \ldots , q_E-1\),
Proof
Given an adversary \({\mathcal A}\), we construct a distinguisher \(\mathcal {D}\) for the “blinding game” of Lemma 3 that works as follows:
-
Phase 1: \(\mathcal {D}\) samples \(F, R \leftarrow \mathcal {F}_n\). It then runs \({\mathcal A}\), answering its quantum queries with F and its classical queries with R, until it replies to \({\mathcal A}\)’s \((j+1)\)st classical query. Let \(T_{j+1} = \{(x_1, y_1), \ldots , (x_{j+1}, y_{j+1})\}\) be the set of classical queries/answers thus far. \(\mathcal {D}\) defines algorithm \(\mathcal B\) as follows: on randomness \(k \in \{0,1\}^n\), output \(B=\{(x_j \oplus k, y_j)\}_{j=1}^{j+1}\). Finally, \(\mathcal {D}\) outputs F and \(\mathcal {B}\).
-
Phase 2: \(\mathcal {D}\) is given quantum access to a function \(F_b\). It continues to run \({\mathcal A}\), answering its quantum queries with \(F_b\) until \({\mathcal A}\) makes its next classical query.
-
Phase 3: \(\mathcal {D}\) is given the randomness k used to run \(\mathcal {B}\). It continues running \({\mathcal A}\), answering its classical queries with \(E_k[F]\) and its quantum queries with \(F_{T_{j+1}, k}\). Finally, \(\mathcal {D}\) outputs whatever \({\mathcal A}\) outputs.
When \(b=0\) (so \(F_b=F_0=F\)), then \({\mathcal A}\)’s output is identically distributed to its output in \({\mathbf {H}}_{j+1}\). On the other hand, when \(b=1\) then \(F_b=F_1=F^{(B)} = F_{T_{j+1},k}\) and so \({\mathcal A}\)’s output is identically distributed to its output in \({\mathbf {H}}'_j\). The expected number of queries made by \(\mathcal {D}\) in phase 2 when \(F=F_0\) is the expected number of queries made by \({\mathcal A}\) in stage \((j+1)\) in \({\mathbf {H}}_{j+1}\). Since \({\mathbf {H}}_{j+1}\) and \({\mathbf {H}}_{q_E}\) are identical until after the \((j+1)\)st stage, this is precisely \(q_{F,j+1}\). Because k is uniform, we can apply Lemma 3 with \(\epsilon =(j+1)/2^n\). The lemma follows. \(\square \)
Lemma 10
For \(j=0, \ldots , q_E\),
Proof
From any adversary \({\mathcal A}\), we construct a distinguisher \(\mathcal D\) for the game of Lemma 4. \(\mathcal {D}\) works as follows:
-
Phase 1: \(\mathcal {D}\) is given quantum access to a (random) function F. It samples \(R \leftarrow \mathcal {F}_n\) and then runs \({\mathcal A}\), answering its quantum queries using F and its classical queries using R, until \({\mathcal A}\) submits its \((j+1)\)st classical query \(x_{j+1}\). At that point, let \(T_j=\{(x_1,y_1), \ldots , (x_j, y_j)\}\) be the set of input/output pairs \({\mathcal A}\) has received from its classical oracle thus far.
-
Phase 2: \(\mathcal {D}\) is given (uniform) \(s \in \{0,1\}^n\) and quantum oracle access to a function \(F_b\). Then \(\mathcal {D}\) sets \(k := s \oplus x_{j+1}\), and then continues running \({\mathcal A}\), answering its classical queries (including the \((j+1)\)st) using \(E_k[F_b]\) and its quantum queries using the function \((F_b)_{T_j, k}\), i.e.,
$$ x \mapsto {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} y &{}\text {if } (x \oplus k, y) \in T_j \\ F_b(x) &{}\text {otherwise.} \end{array}\right. } $$Finally, \(\mathcal {D}\) outputs whatever \({\mathcal A}\) outputs.
We analyze the execution of \(\mathcal D\) in the two cases of the game of Lemma 4. In either case, the quantum queries of \({\mathcal A}\) in stages \(0, \ldots , j\) are answered using a random function F, and \({\mathcal A}\)’s first j classical queries are answered using an independent random function R. Note further that since s is uniform, so is k.
Case 1: \(b=0\) . In this case, all the remaining classical queries of \({\mathcal A}\) (i.e., from the \((j+1)\)st on) are answered using \(E_k[F]\), and the remaining quantum queries of \({\mathcal A}\) are answered using \(F_{T_j, k}\). The output of \({\mathcal A}\) is thus distributed identically to its output in \({\mathbf {H}}_j\) in this case.
Case 2: \(b=1\) . Here, \(F_b=F_1=F_{s \rightarrow y}\) for a uniform y. Now, the response to the \((j+1)\)st classical query of \({\mathcal A}\) is
Since y is uniform and independent of anything else, and since \({\mathcal A}\) has never previously queried \(x_{j+1}\) to its classical oracle, this is equivalent to answering the first \(j+1\) classical queries of \({\mathcal A}\) using a random function R. The remaining classical queries of \({\mathcal A}\) are also answered using \(E_k[F_{s \mapsto y}]\). However, since \(E_k[F_{s \rightarrow y}](x)=E_k[F](x)\) for all \(x \ne x_{j+1}\) and \({\mathcal A}\) never repeats the query \(x_{j+1}\), this is equivalent to answering the remaining classical queries of \({\mathcal A}\) using \(E_k[F]\).
The remaining quantum queries of \({\mathcal A}\) are answered with the function
This, in turn, is precisely the function \(F_{T_{j+1}, k}\), where \(T_{j+1}\) is obtained by adding \((x_{j+1}, y)\) to \(T_j\) (and thus consists of the first \(j+1\) classical queries made by \({\mathcal A}\) and their corresponding responses). Thus, the output of \({\mathcal A}\) in this case is distributed identically to its output in \({\mathbf {H}}_j'\).
The number of quantum queries made by \(\mathcal {D}\) in phase 1 is at most \(q_F\). The claimed result thus follows from Lemma 4. \(\square \)
Using Lemmas 9 and 10, and the fact that \(\sum _{j=1}^{q_E}q_{F,j}=q_F\), we have
as required. \(\square \)
B Further Details for the Proof of Lemma 7
1.1 B.1 Equivalence of \(\mathsf{Expt}'_j\) and \({\mathbf {H}}'_j\)
The code in the top portion of Fig. 2 is a syntactic rewriting of \(\mathsf{Expt}'_j\). (Flags that have no effect on the output of \({\mathcal A}\) are omitted.) In line 27, the computation of \(y_{j+1}\) has been expanded (note that \(E_k[P_1](x_{j+1}) = P_1(s_0) \oplus k_2 = P(s_1) \oplus k_2\)). In line 31, Q has been replaced with \(P_{T_{j+1},k}\) and \(\mathcal {O}\) has been replaced with \(E_k[P]\) as justified in the proof of Lemma 7.
The code in the middle portion of Fig. 2 results from the following changes: first, rather than sampling uniform \(s_0\) and then setting \(k_1:=s_0 \oplus x_{j+1}\), the code now samples a uniform \(k_1\). Similarly, rather than choosing uniform \(s_1\) and then setting \(y_{j+1}:=P(s_1) \oplus k_2\), the code now samples a uniform \(y_{j+1}\) (note that P is a permutation, so \(P(s_1)\) is uniform). Since neither \(s_0\) nor \(s_1\) is used anywhere else, each can now be omitted.
The code in the bottom portion of Fig. 2 simply chooses \(k=(k_1, k_2)\) according to distribution D, and chooses uniform \(y_{j+1} \in \{0,1\}^n \setminus \{y_1, \ldots , y_j\}\). It can be verified by inspection that this final experiment is equivalent to \({\mathbf {H}}'_j\).
1.2 B.2 Handling an Inverse Query
In this section we discuss the case where the \((j+1)\)st classical query of \({\mathcal A}\) is a inverse query in the proof of Lemma 7. Phase 1 is exactly as described in the proof of Lemma 7, though we now let \(y_{j+1}\) denote the \((j+1)\)st classical query made by \({\mathcal A}\), and now \(b_{j+1}=1\).
-
Phase 2: \(\mathcal {D}\) receives \(s_0, s_1 \in \{0,1\}^n\) and quantum oracle access to a permutation \(P_b\). First, \(\mathcal {D}\) sets \(t_0:=P_b(s_0)\) and \(t_1:=P_b(s_1)\). It then sets \(k_2:=t_0 \oplus y_{j+1}\), chooses \(k_1 \leftarrow D_{|k_2}\) (where this represents the conditional distribution on \(k_1\) given \(k_2\)), and sets \(k:=(k_1, k_2)\). \(\mathcal {D}\) continues running \({\mathcal A}\), answering its remaining classical queries (including the \((j+1)\)st one) using \(E_k[P_b]\), and its remaining quantum queries using
$$\begin{aligned} (P_b)_{T_j, k}&= \overleftarrow{S}_{T_j,P_b,k}\circ \overrightarrow{S}_{T_j,P_b,k} \circ P_b= P_b \circ \overleftarrow{Q}_{T_j,P_b,k} \circ \overrightarrow{Q}_{T_j,P_b,k}\,. \end{aligned}$$Finally, \(\mathcal {D}\) outputs whatever \({\mathcal A}\) outputs.
Note that \(t_0, t_1\) are uniform, and so k is distributed according to D. Then:
Case \(b=0\) (No Reprogramming). In this case, \({\mathcal A}\)’s remaining classical queries (including its \((j+1)\)st classical query) are answered using \(E_k[P_0] = E_k[P]\), and its remaining quantum queries are answered using \((P_0)_{T_j, k} = P_{T_j, k}\). The output of \({\mathcal A}\) is thus distributed identically to its output in \({\mathbf {H}}_j\) in this case.
Case \(b=1\) (Reprogramming). In this case, \(k_2=P_1(s_0) \oplus y_{j+1}=P(s_1)\oplus y_{j+1}\) and so
The response to \({\mathcal A}\)’s \((j+1)\)st classical query is thus
The remaining classical queries of \({\mathcal A}\) are then answered using \(E_k[P_1]\), while its remaining quantum queries are answered using \((P_1)_{T_j, k}\).
Now we define the following three events:
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1.
\(\mathsf{bad}_1\) is the event that \(x_{j+1} \in \{x_1, \ldots , x_j\}\).
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2.
\(\mathsf{bad}_2\) is the event that \(P(s_0) \oplus k_2 \in \{y_1, \ldots , y_j\}\).
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3.
\(\mathsf{bad}_3\) is the event that, in phase 2, \({\mathcal A}\) queries its classical oracle in the forward direction on \(s_1 \oplus k_1\), or the inverse direction on \(P(s_0) \oplus k_2\).
Comparing the above to the proof of Lemma 7, we see (because P is a permutation) that the situation is entirely symmetric, and the analysis is therefore the same.
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Alagic, G., Bai, C., Katz, J., Majenz, C. (2022). Post-Quantum Security of the Even-Mansour Cipher. In: Dunkelman, O., Dziembowski, S. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2022. EUROCRYPT 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13277. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07082-2_17
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