Abstract
Mix networks were developed to hide the correspondence between senders and recipients of the communication. In order to be usable and defend user privacy, anonymous communication networks like mixnets need to be parameterized in an optimal manner. This work uses a mixnet simulator to determine reasonable packet size and parameters for the real-world Nym mixnet, a stratified continuous-time mixnet that uses the Sphinx packet format. We analyzed network parameters, such as the sending rate, cover traffic overhead, and mixing delay, to determine the impact of various configurations on the anonymity and performance.
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Jee, M., Piotrowska, A.M., Halpin, H., Marina, N. (2022). Optimizing Anonymity and Performance in a Mix Network. In: Aïmeur, E., Laurent, M., Yaich, R., Dupont, B., Garcia-Alfaro, J. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13291. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08147-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08147-7_4
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