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Protecting Privacy Using Low-Cost Data Diodes and Strong Cryptography

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Intelligent Computing (SAI 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems ((LNNS,volume 508))

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Abstract

Compromised near-body electronic devices, like an eye tracker or a brain-computer interface, can leak private, highly sensitive biometric or medical data. Such data must be protected at all costs to avoid mass-surveillance and hacking attempts. We review the current, dire state of network security caused by complex protocols, closed-source software and proprietary hardware. To tackle the issue, we discuss a concept that protects privacy by combining three elements: data diodes, strong encryption and true random number generators. For each element, we suggest low-complexity algorithms and low-cost hardware solutions that can be implemented using off-the-shelf components. Already a basic data diode can establish a strong barrier against hacking attempts. A carefully designed, shielded and monitored system combining data diodes and strong encryption can make most levels of attack infeasible.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The HCPL-7723 chip is approximately ten times more expensive than the 6N136, but still very affordable compared to commercial data diode solutions.

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  1. Rhein Waal University, Kamp Lintfort, Germany

    André Frank Krause & Kai Essig

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  1. André Frank Krause
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Correspondence to André Frank Krause .

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  1. Saga University, Saga, Japan

    Kohei Arai

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Krause, A.F., Essig, K. (2022). Protecting Privacy Using Low-Cost Data Diodes and Strong Cryptography. In: Arai, K. (eds) Intelligent Computing. SAI 2022. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, vol 508. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10467-1_47

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