Abstract
Private set intersection (PSI) allows two parties, who each hold a set of items, to learn which items they have in common, without revealing anything about their other items. Some applications of PSI would be better served by revealing only one common item, rather than the entire set of all common items. In this work we develop simple special-purpose protocols for privately finding one common item (FOCI) from the intersection of two sets. The protocols differ in how that item is chosen—e.g., uniformly at random from the intersection; the “best” item in the intersection according to one party’s ranking; or the “best” item in the intersection according to the sum of both party’s scores. All of our protocols are proven secure against semi-honest adversaries, under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and assuming a random oracle. All of our protocols leak a small amount of information (e.g., the cardinality of the intersection), which we precisely quantify.
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Notes
- 1.
All protocols for computing functions of the intersection can be readily augmented to support data associated with the items, e.g., scores/ranks.
- 2.
There are some situations where Alice could use this leakage to deduce some information about the intersection and about Bob’s ranks. For example, suppose Alice assigns ranks \(r_1< r_2 < \cdots \) to her items \(x_1, x_2, \ldots \), respectively, and then she later learns that the intersection contains an item with combined rank \(r^*\). If \(r^* < r_2\) (and all ranks are nonnegative), she can deduce that item \(x_1\) is in the intersection, and that Bob must have assigned rank \(r^* - r_1\) to that item.
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Acknowledgements
The first two authors are supported by NSF award DMS-1757995. We are grateful to anonymous SCN referees for the improvements they suggested to the manuscript.
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Beauregard, T., Xia, J., Rosulek, M. (2022). Finding One Common Item, Privately. In: Galdi, C., Jarecki, S. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13409. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14791-3_20
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