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Opportunistic Algorithmic Double-Spending:

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Fork

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Computer Security – ESORICS 2022 (ESORICS 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13554))

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Abstract

In this paper, we outline a novel form of attack we refer to as Opportunistic Algorithmic Double-Spending (OpAl). OpAl attacks avoid equivocation, i.e., do not require conflicting transactions, and are carried out automatically in case of a fork. Algorithmic double-spending is facilitated through transaction semantics that dynamically depend on the context and ledger state at the time of execution. Hence, OpAl evades common double-spending detection mechanisms and can opportunistically leverage forks, even if the malicious sender themselves is not responsible for, or even actively aware of, any fork. Forkable ledger designs with expressive transaction semantics, especially stateful EVM-based smart contract platforms such as Ethereum, are particularly vulnerable. Hereby, the cost of modifying a regular transaction to opportunistically perform an OpAl attack is low enough to consider it a viable default strategy. While Bitcoin’s stateless UTXO model, or Cardano’s EUTXO model, appear more robust against OpAl, we nevertheless demonstrate scenarios where transactions are semantically malleable and thus vulnerable. To determine whether OpAl-like semantics can be observed in practice, we analyze the execution traces of \(922\,562\) transactions on the Ethereum blockchain. Hereby, we are able to identify transactions, which may be associated with frontrunning and MEV bots, that exhibit some of the design patterns also employed as part of the herein presented attack.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    cf. https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0034.mediawiki.

  2. 2.

    [7] assume that in practice a tick will correspond to a block number or block height.

  3. 3.

    Thereby introducing the possibility of unintentional OpAl attacks (see Sect. 2).

  4. 4.

    For simplicity we consider legacy transactions and omit pricing based on EIP-1559.

  5. 5.

    Cf. the Ethereum Yellow paper [51] for details on EVM opcodes and their behavior.

  6. 6.

    Cf. https://ethervm.io/decompile/0x000000000035B5e5ad9019092C665357240f594e.

  7. 7.

    Cf. txn: 0x2368617cf02cf083eed2d8691004c1ad0176976b6fa83873bc6b0fd7de4cc7fc.

  8. 8.

    We note that scheduled protocol updates carry a risk of unintentional forks, and an adversary may try to leverage this by performing OpAl transactions at that time.

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Acknowledgements

This material is based upon work partially supported by (1) the Christian-Doppler-Laboratory for Security and Quality Improvement in the Production System Lifecycle; The financial support by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Digital and Economic Affairs, the Nation Foundation for Research, Technology and Development and University of Vienna, Faculty of Computer Science, Security & Privacy Group is gratefully acknowledged; (2) SBA Research; the competence center SBA Research (SBA-K1) funded within the framework of COMET Competence Centers for Excellent Technologies by BMVIT, BMDW, and the federal state of Vienna, managed by the FFG; (3) the FFG Industrial PhD projects 878835 and 878736. (4) the FFG ICT of the Future project 874019 dIdentity & dApps. (5) the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 826078 (FeatureCloud). We would also like to thank our anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Nicholas Stifter, Aljosha Judmayer, Philipp Schindler & Edgar Weippl

  2. SBA Research, Vienna, Austria

    Nicholas Stifter, Aljosha Judmayer, Philipp Schindler & Edgar Weippl

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  1. Nicholas Stifter
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Correspondence to Nicholas Stifter .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Rutgers University, Newark, NJ, USA

    Vijayalakshmi Atluri

  2. Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar

    Roberto Di Pietro

  3. Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark

    Christian D. Jensen

  4. Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark

    Weizhi Meng

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Stifter, N., Judmayer, A., Schindler, P., Weippl, E. (2022). Opportunistic Algorithmic Double-Spending:. In: Atluri, V., Di Pietro, R., Jensen, C.D., Meng, W. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2022. ESORICS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13554. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17140-6_3

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