Abstract
Mixing protocols serve as a promising solution to the unlinkability in blockchains. They work by hiding one transaction among a set of transactions and enjoy the advantage of high compatibility with the underlying system. However, due to the inherent public addresses of the blockchains built on the account-based model, the unlinkability is highly restricted to non-confidential transactions. In this paper, we propose MixCT, a mixing service for confidential payment systems built from homomorphic commitment in the account-based model. We provide an efficient instantiation of MixCT by the Pedersen commitment and the one-out-of-many proof. The evaluation results show that MixCT introduces a small cost for its users while being highly compatible with the underlying blockchain.
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61872142, 62072305), the Key (Keygrant) Project of Chinese Ministry of Education (No. 2020KJ010201), the Key Research and Development Plan of Shandong Province (No. 2021CXGC010105), and the Open Project of Shanghai Key Laboratory of Trustworthy Computing under grant No. OP202205.
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Du, J. et al. (2022). MixCT: Mixing Confidential Transactions from Homomorphic Commitment. In: Atluri, V., Di Pietro, R., Jensen, C.D., Meng, W. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2022. ESORICS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13556. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17143-7_39
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