Abstract
In the present paper we propose an improvement of Bleichenbacher’s Oracle Padding Attack that makes breaking more restrictive implementations of the PKCS#1 v1.5 standard feasible both theoretically and in practice. It is proven that the current attack requires at most a quarter of the total number of queries used by the original version. Using the proposed algorithm, we conducted experiments on various restrictive oracles for illustrating the theoretical improvement, and attacked a real device that implements the PKCS #11 standard in a reasonable amount of time. Note that the use of the original algorithm would have led to only a partial decryption of the ciphertext in a larger time interval.
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Notes
- 1.
Of course, until quantum computers will become truly practical for performing quantum cryptanalysis.
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The author would like to thank Paul Cotan, Cristi Hristea, Diana Maimut and George Teseleanu for their helpful comments.
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Kelesidis, EA. (2022). An Optimization of Bleichenbacher’s Oracle Padding Attack. In: Ryan, P.Y., Toma, C. (eds) Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications. SecITC 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13195. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17510-7_10
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