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Scalable M+1st-Price Auction with Infinite Bidding Price

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Science of Cyber Security (SciSec 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13580))

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Abstract

\(M+1\)st-price auction, also called Vickrey auction, is a type of sealed-bid auction to sell M identical goods. B bidders secretly choose a bid. The top M bidders can buy the goods at the \(M+1\)st bidding price. In previous research, a trusted manager is commonly used to decide the \(M+1\)st bidding price from these sealed ones and the top M bidders. In addition, there’s an upper bound to the bidding price. We construct a scheme that removes all trusted parties such as managers and Mix servers in such a way that winning bidders themselves just prove that they are winners. By adopting a compact bit-slice design, the upper bound is removed, and the compact bit-slice design can also reduce the complexity of the number of bidders to sublinear. Our implementation shows that the gas usage reduces by \(95\%\) after we use zero-knowledge proof to replace Mix and Match. The overall gas usage is also reduced by \(83\%\). This protocol reached the ultimate goal of decentralized apps (DApps): Decentralized: no TTP or manager is used. Scalable: unlimited bidding price and sublinear complexity to the number of bidders. Robustness, the auction does not necessarily need to restart if there are some malicious bidders at the first time.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://github.com/tonypottera24/m-1st_auction_ec_sol.

  2. 2.

    https://github.com/tonypottera24/m-1st_auction_ec_py.

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Acknowledgement

This work is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP21H03443, Innovation Platform for Society 5.0 at MEXT, and JST Next Generation Researchers Challenging Research Program JPMJSP2138.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Osaka University, Suita, Japan

    Po-Chu Hsu & Atsuko Miyaji

  2. Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Nomi, Japan

    Atsuko Miyaji

Authors
  1. Po-Chu Hsu
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  2. Atsuko Miyaji
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Correspondence to Atsuko Miyaji .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Aizu, Aizuwakamatsu, Fukushima, Japan

    Chunhua Su

  2. Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Kouichi Sakurai

  3. Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Feng Liu

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Hsu, PC., Miyaji, A. (2022). Scalable M+1st-Price Auction with Infinite Bidding Price. In: Su, C., Sakurai, K., Liu, F. (eds) Science of Cyber Security. SciSec 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13580. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17551-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17551-0_8

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-17551-0

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