Abstract
Multi-party private set intersection (MP-PSI) allows m participants with private sets to calculate their intersection without revealing any information, which is quite different from the traditional two-party PSI. Although some efficient MP-PSI protocols already exist, the efficiency of these protocols decreases significantly in the scenarios with the increasing number of participants for the small sets setting. In this paper, we propose efficient MP-PSI protocols based on one-round two-party key agreement embedding with unconditional zero sharing technique and prove secure by resisting up to \(m-2\) parties collision in the semi-honest model and \(m-1\) parties collision in the malicious model. Compared with the current efficient MP-PSI, our protocol performs better in terms of the communication round, communication cost and the running time in small sets setting. Extensive experiments show that as the number of participants m increases from 5 to 50 and the upbound of the set size n scales from \(2^8\) to \(2^{10}\), the running time of our MP-PSI protocol is faster than those of the most efficient MP-PSI protocol [14] and the recent work [4]. Take the set size at \(2^{7}\) for example, as the number of the participants increases from 10 to 50, our protocol only requires 4–26\(\times \) less running time and 8–11\(\times \) less communication cost than those of [14], respectively. We conclude that our protocols are practical solutions suitable for the scenarios in small set setting with increasing participants.
This work is supported in part by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61972241, in part by Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai under Grant 22ZR1427100 and 18ZR1417300, and in part by Luo-Zhaorao College Student Science and Technology Innovation Foundation of Shanghai Ocean University.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Baldi, P., Baronio, R., De Cristofaro, E., Gasti, P., Tsudik, G.: Countering GATTACA: efficient and secure testing of fully-sequenced human genomes. In: Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2011), pp. 691–702. ACM (2011)
Miao, P., Patel, S., Raykova, M., Seth, K., Yung, M.: Two-sided malicious security for private intersection-sum with cardinality. In: Micciancio, D., Ristenpart, T. (eds.) CRYPTO 2020. LNCS, vol. 12172, pp. 3–33. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56877-1_1
Heinrich, A., Hollick, M., Schneider, T., Stute, M., Weinert, C.: PrivateDrop: practical privacy-preserving authentication for apple airdrop. In: 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 2021), pp. 3577–3594. USENIX Association (2021)
Bay, A., Erkin, Z., Alishahi, M., Vos, J.: Practical multi-party private set intersection protocols. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 17, 1–15 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2021.3118879
Bay, A., Erkin, Z., Alishahi, M., Vos, J.: Multi-party private set intersection protocols for practical applications. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. (2021). (SECRYPT 2021), pp. 515–522. SciTePress
Ishai, Y., Kilian, J., Nissim, K., Petrank, E.: Extending oblivious transfers efficiently. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 145–161. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_9
Kolesnikov, V., Kumaresan, R.: Improved OT extension for transferring short secrets. In: Canetti, R., Garay, J.A. (eds.) CRYPTO 2013. LNCS, vol. 8043, pp. 54–70. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40084-1_4
Schoppmann, P., Gascón, A., Reichert, L., Raykova, M.: Distributed vector-OLE: improved constructions and implementation. In: 26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2019), pp. 1055–1072. ACM (2019)
Kolesnikov, V., Kumaresan, R., Rosulek, M., Trieu, N.: Efficient batched oblivious PRF with applications to private set intersection. In: 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2016), pp. 818–829. ACM (2016)
Pinkas, B., Rosulek, M., Trieu, N., Yanai, A.: SpOT-Light: lightweight private set intersection from sparse OT extension. In: Boldyreva, A., Micciancio, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 2019. LNCS, vol. 11694, pp. 401–431. Springer, Cham (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8_13
Pinkas, B., Rosulek, M., Trieu, N., Yanai, A.: PSI from PaXoS: fast, malicious private set intersection. In: Canteaut, A., Ishai, Y. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2020. LNCS, vol. 12106, pp. 739–767. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25
Chase, M., Miao, P.: Private set intersection in the internet setting from lightweight oblivious PRF. In: Micciancio, D., Ristenpart, T. (eds.) CRYPTO 2020. LNCS, vol. 12172, pp. 34–63. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56877-1_2
Rindal, P., Schoppmann, P.: VOLE-PSI: fast OPRF and circuit-psi from vector-OLE. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2021/266 (2021)
Kolesnikov, V., Matania, N., Pinkas, B., Rosulek, M., Trieu, N.: Practical multi-party private set intersection from symmetric-key techniques. In: 24th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2017), pp. 1257–1272. ACM (2017)
Chen, H., Laine, K., Rindal, P.: Fast private set intersection from homomorphic encryption. In: 24th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2017), pp. 1243–1255. ACM (2017)
Davi Resende, A.C., de Freitas Aranha, D.: Faster unbalanced Private Set Intersection in the semi-honest setting. J. Cryptogr. Eng. 11(1), 21–38 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-020-00242-7
Rosulek, M., Trieu, N.: Compact and malicious private set intersection for small sets. In: 28th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2021), pp. 1166–1181. ACM (2021)
Meadows, C.A.: A more efficient cryptographic matchmaking protocol for use in the absence of a continuously available third party. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (IEEE S &P 1986), pp. 134–137. IEEE (1986)
Huberman, B.A., Franklin, M., Hogg, T.: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 78–86 (1999)
Pinkas, B., Schneider, T., Zohner, M.: Faster private set intersection based on OT extension. In: 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 2014), pp. 797–812. USENIX Association (2014)
Chandran, N., Dasgupta, N., Gupta, D., Obbattu, S.L.B., Sekar, S., Shah, A.: Efficient linear multiparty PSI and extensions to circuit/quorum PSI. In: 28th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2021), pp. 1182–1204. ACM (2021)
Hazay, C., Venkitasubramaniam, M.: Scalable multi-party private set-intersection. In: Fehr, S. (ed.) PKC 2017. LNCS, vol. 10174, pp. 175–203. Springer, Heidelberg (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54365-8_8
Hao, F., Zieliński, P.: A 2-round anonymous veto protocol. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds.) Security Protocols 2006. LNCS, vol. 5087, pp. 202–211. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04904-0_28
Bernstein, D.J., Hamburg, M., Krasnova, A., Lange, T.: Elligator: elliptic-curve points indistinguishable from uniform random strings. In: 20th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2013), pp. 967–980. ACM (2013)
Garimella, G., Pinkas, B., Rosulek, M., Trieu, N., Yanai, A.: Oblivious key-value stores and amplification for private set intersection. In: Malkin, T., Peikert, C. (eds.) CRYPTO 2021. LNCS, vol. 12826, pp. 395–425. Springer, Cham (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_14
Nevo, O., Trieu, N., Yanai, A.: Simple, fast malicious multiparty private set intersection. In: 28th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2021), pp. 1151–1165. ACM (2021)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Wei, L., Liu, J., Zhang, L., Zhang, W. (2022). Efficient and Collusion Resistant Multi-party Private Set Intersection Protocols for Large Participants and Small Sets Setting. In: Chen, X., Shen, J., Susilo, W. (eds) Cyberspace Safety and Security. CSS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13547. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18067-5_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18067-5_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-18066-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-18067-5
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)