Abstract
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are decentralized applications that allow users to exchange crypto-tokens without the need for a matching exchange order. AMMs are one of the most successful DeFi use cases: indeed, major AMM platforms process a daily volume of transactions worth USD billions. Despite their popularity, AMMs are well-known to suffer from transaction-ordering issues: adversaries can influence the ordering of user transactions, and possibly front-run them with their own, to extract value from AMMs, to the detriment of users. We devise an effective procedure to construct a strategy through which an adversary can maximize the value extracted from user transactions.
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Notes
- 1.
We name it after Dagwood Bumstead, a comic strip character who is often illustrated while producing enormous multi-layer sandwiches.
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Acknowledgements
Massimo Bartoletti is partially supported by Conv. Fondazione di Sardegna & Atenei Sardi project F75F21001220007 ASTRID. James Hsin-yu Chiang is supported by the PhD School of DTU Compute.
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Bartoletti, M., Chiang, J.Hy., Lluch Lafuente, A. (2022). Maximizing Extractable Value from Automated Market Makers. In: Eyal, I., Garay, J. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13411. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_1
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