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Short Paper: On the Claims of Weak Block Synchronization in Bitcoin

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13411))

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Abstract

Recent Bitcoin attacks [15, 17, 18] commonly exploit the phenomenon of so-called weak block synchronization in Bitcoin. The attacks use two independently-operated Bitcoin monitors — i.e., Bitnodes and a system of customized supernodes — to confirm that block propagation in Bitcoin is surprisingly slow. In particular, Bitnodes constantly reports that around 30% of nodes are 3 blocks (or more) behind the blockchain tip and the supernodes show that on average more than 60% of nodes do not receive the latest block even after waiting for 10 min. In this paper, we carefully re-evaluate these controversial claims with our own experiments in the live Bitcoin network and show that block propagation in Bitcoin is, in fact, fast enough (e.g., most peers we monitor receive new blocks in about 4 s) for its safety property. We identify several limitations and bugs of the two monitors, which have led to these inaccurate claims about the Bitcoin block synchronization. We finally ask several open-ended questions regarding the technical and ethical issues around monitoring blockchain networks.

S. Baek and H. Nam—Co-leading authors.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) grant funded by the Korean Government (22ZR1330, Research on Intelligent Cyber Security and Trust Infra).

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Correspondence to Min Suk Kang .

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© 2022 International Financial Cryptography Association

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Baek, S., Nam, H., Oh, Y., Tran, M., Kang, M.S. (2022). Short Paper: On the Claims of Weak Block Synchronization in Bitcoin. In: Eyal, I., Garay, J. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13411. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_33

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_33

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-18282-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-18283-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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