Abstract
Lightweight cryptography is a subfield of cryptography, which is widely used in embedded systems, RFID, sensor networks, and so on. However, the leakage information during the operation of these IoT devices can be exploited by adversaries and subjected to side-channel attacks. Simultaneously, only a small number of previous works show these attacks. In this work, we perform the soft analytical side-channel attack (SASCA) on the encryption of Ascon. Since we construct a unique factor graph for Ascon, we can also use it to attack the masked implementations. The point of attack is the permutation function, one of Ascon’s most basic components. Our attack mainly consists of three steps. At the first, we run a side-channel template matching on the initialization phase. Then, we build a factor graph describing the intermediate computations in permutation, including the observed leakage for the intermediate variables. Third, we run a Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm that takes full advantage of these leakages. Through simulations, we show that the entire key can be successfully recovered by only using the leakage information of a few traces, and it also offers low time and memory complexity.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Key R &D Program of China (Grant No. 2020AAA0107703), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 62132008, 62072247, 62071222), the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province, China (Grant No. BK20220075).
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Luo, S., Wu, W., Li, Y., Zhang, R., Liu, Z. (2022). An Efficient Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attack on Ascon. In: Wang, L., Segal, M., Chen, J., Qiu, T. (eds) Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications. WASA 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13471. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19208-1_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19208-1_32
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