MANIPULATION OF G-CODE TOOLPATH FILES IN 3D PRINTERS: ATTACKS AND MITIGATIONS

Abstract

Additive manufacturing or 3D printing is commonly used to create mission-critical parts in the critical infrastructure. This research focuses on threats that target the key slicing step of additive manufacturing, when design files that model part geometry are converted to G-code toolpath files that convey instructions for printing parts layer by layer. The research leverages a hitherto unknown slicing software vulnerability where G-code corresponding to part slices is stored as plaintext ASCII characters in heap memory during execution. The vulnerability was discovered in two open-source, full-featured slicing software suites that support many 3D printers.

Experiments with a toolkit developed to target slicing software in real time demonstrate that the attacks are surreptitious and fine-grained. Two attacks, temperature modification and infill exclusion, performed against G-code generated for fused filament fabrication printers demonstrate the ability to sabotage printed parts as well as print environments. Although the vulnerability can be mitigated using strong authentication and access controls along with G-code obfuscation, the ability to automate surreptitious, fine-grained attacks that degrade printed parts in ways that are imperceptible to the human eye and undetectible by nondestructive testing methods is a serious concern.