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Practical Non-malleable Codes from Symmetric-Key Primitives in 2-Split-State Model

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Provable and Practical Security (ProvSec 2022)

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Abstract

Non-malleable codes (NMC) are introduced as a relaxation of error correcting codes to protect message against tampering attacks. It is guaranteed that a message encoded with non-malleable codes, if tampered by some classes of tampering functions, produces either completely unrelated message or the original message, when tampering has no effect. Kiayias et al. [19] have proposed a NMC construction based on leakage resilient authenticated encryption (AE) and 1-more extractable hash function. They obtain a codeword of length \(|m|+18n\) in common reference string (CRS) model. In this paper, we propose a construction of computationally secure non-malleable code in 2-split-state model from an authenticated encryption scheme with close to optimal codeword length \(|m|+2n\). Specifically we use an AE based on triple M-DES and CBC-MAC. The security of our NMC reduces to related-key and pseudorandom permutation security of the underlying block cipher under leakage, and also to the unforgeability of the CBC-MAC under leakage.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, IIT Kharagpur, Kharagpur, India

    Anit Kumar Ghosal, Satrajit Ghosh & Dipanwita Roychowdhury

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  1. Anit Kumar Ghosal
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  2. Satrajit Ghosh
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  3. Dipanwita Roychowdhury
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Correspondence to Anit Kumar Ghosal .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China

    Chunpeng Ge

  2. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Fuchun Guo

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Ghosal, A.K., Ghosh, S., Roychowdhury, D. (2022). Practical Non-malleable Codes from Symmetric-Key Primitives in 2-Split-State Model. In: Ge, C., Guo, F. (eds) Provable and Practical Security. ProvSec 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13600. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20917-8_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20917-8_18

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-20916-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-20917-8

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