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Epoch Confidentiality in Updatable Encryption

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Provable and Practical Security (ProvSec 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13600))

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Abstract

In this paper we formalise public-key Updatable Encryption (PKUE), a primitive so far studied formally only in the symmetric setting. Defining UE in the public-key setting enables us to establish a new notion of security we call epoch confidentiality (EC) which considers the ability of an adversary to distinguish the public keys used in periods known as epochs and in turn reflects the leakage of the time in which a ciphertext was created. We propose a public-key UE construction and prove that it satisfies our new notion of security alongside a notion of ciphertext confidentiality such that efficiency is not affected by moving to the public-key setting.

J. Knapp—The research of Knapp was supported by the EPSRC and the UK government as part of the Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security at Royal Holloway, University of London (EP/P009301/1).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

    Jodie Knapp & Elizabeth A. Quaglia

Authors
  1. Jodie Knapp
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  2. Elizabeth A. Quaglia
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Correspondence to Jodie Knapp .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China

    Chunpeng Ge

  2. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Fuchun Guo

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Knapp, J., Quaglia, E.A. (2022). Epoch Confidentiality in Updatable Encryption. In: Ge, C., Guo, F. (eds) Provable and Practical Security. ProvSec 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13600. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20917-8_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20917-8_5

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-20917-8

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