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How to Design Authenticated Key Exchange for Wearable Devices: Cryptanalysis of AKE for Health Monitoring and Countermeasures via Distinct SMs with Key Split and Refresh

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Cryptology and Network Security (CANS 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13641))

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Abstract

We provide a cryptanalysis of a certain type of an authenticated key exchange protocol (AKE) for wearable devices. Subsequently, we propose a secure construction based on a modified SIGMA protocol with strengthened signature blocks and an additional out-of-bound channel. Specifically, we propose a signature scheme with an additive split of the signing key with a refresh mechanism. We analyze the security of the scheme, assuming that partial keys are stored in distinct hardware signature modules of the signing devices. We use these constructions for strengthening the SIGMA key exchange protocol. Refreshing the partial key shares in each protocol execution protects against potential key leakage from a single SM. Such leakages can occur due to unintended errors in implementations, or malicious hardware manufacturers. We give a formal security analysis in our strengthen Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model with long-term secret key splitting and refresh over two separated signature modules.

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Acknowledgments

The research was partially financed from the Fundamental Research Fund number 8211104160 of the Wrocław University of Science and Technology.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Fundamentals of Computer Science, Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Wrocław, Poland

    Łukasz Krzywiecki

  2. Department of Information and Communication Technology, Swedish Transport Administration, Borlänge, Sweden

    Hannes Salin

Authors
  1. Łukasz Krzywiecki
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  2. Hannes Salin
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Correspondence to Hannes Salin .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

    Alastair R. Beresford

  2. Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India

    Arpita Patra

  3. Cryptography Research Center, Technology Innovation Institute, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

    Emanuele Bellini

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Krzywiecki, Ł., Salin, H. (2022). How to Design Authenticated Key Exchange for Wearable Devices: Cryptanalysis of AKE for Health Monitoring and Countermeasures via Distinct SMs with Key Split and Refresh. In: Beresford, A.R., Patra, A., Bellini, E. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13641. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20974-1_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20974-1_11

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